CONFORMITY AS SELF-PERSUASION: THEORY AND TEST

 

 

LON C. GREEN

FERRIS STATE UNIVERSITY

 

Abstract

 

Though much research in social influence has assumed conformity behavior is a form of self-induced behavior, little research exists to support the notion. This research conceptualizes conformity as a form of self-persuasion, and suggests people act on the basis of self-persuasive strategies that are much like compliance-gaining strategies applied to others. Brief research establishes some efficacy for accepting conformity as a form of self-persuasion, and suggests research is needed to further establish the relationship between self-persuasion, conformity, and behavior.

 

 

American Association of Behavioral and Social Science

Feb. 12, 2003

 

Introduction

Though, as Aronson (1980) suggests, Aristotle may have been the first person “to formulate basic principles of social influence and persuasion” (p. 1), those with interests in social influence are often underwhelmed by what we actually know about the process. Indeed, Tedeschi (1972, preface) concludes, “the current status of theory and research in the area of influence is clearly inadequate from anybody’s point of view.” More recently, Smith (1982a) refers to a “growing dissatisfaction with the traditional paradigm” of one particular area of social influence: persuasion (p. 359).

These thoughts apply especially to the study of another precise area of the social influence paradigm, or conformity. Hollander & Willis point out that though the literature available in this area seems endless, it nevertheless “remains disparate in many of its implications” (pp. 62-63).  They continue by suggesting a re-evaluation of current thought on conformity as well as a re-structuring of approaches to research on conformity. Specifically, they advocate “re-examining most carefully” the meaning of conformity as “currently conceptualized, and as operationalized in psychological research” (in Borgatta, 1969, p. 413).  A review of the literature since that time establishes that not only has such a re-structuring not taken place, but also that research on conformity continues to treat it as in the past.

The purpose of this research, then, is to attempt that restructuring of thought regarding “conformity,” and to apply that restructured thought in a brief research project designed

to test its viability. Simply put, it is time to undertake a “construct re-evaluation and explication,” and that is what this paper shall do.

Re-conceptualizing conformity

Green (1984) provides the impetus for such a re-structuring. In a post-hoc analysis of his findings, he intimates a relationship between a tendency to conform and “persuasibility.” And though persuasibility is most likely a personality trait, a number of others have also suggested a relationship between persuasibility and conformity. McGuire (1968) writes that suggestibility, persuasibility, and conformity are “general traits” related to each other, as well as evidenced by most people to some degree. Furnham (1978) presents a bibliography of over 100 studies on the relationship between persuasibility and conformity, and briefly notes in synthesis of these studies that, in general, there is a close parallel between persuasibility and the tendency to conform.

What is critical for the present purpose is not necessarily the relationship between persuasibility and conformity, but rather the relationship between the influences acting on these two traits: persuasion and pressure to conform. It is the position here that there is a distinct relationship between these two concepts.

Note initially the need to define conformity for this research: conformity is a “change in behavior or belief toward a group as a result of real or imagined group pressure” (Aronson, 1980, p. 171; Kiesler & Kiesler, 1969, p. 2). Compare this definition with widely accepted views of what persuasion is.  Fisher (1978) suggests the effects of persuasion are seen in “some discernible result or change in the receivers” (p. 166). Miller & Burgoon present a definition of persuasion even more closely paralleling that of Kiesler & Kiesler: “Persuasion is almost synonymous with changes in overt behavior or attitudinal valence” (1973, p. 6). And Miller (1980) speaks of “being persuaded” as referring to situations “where behavior has been modified” (p. 15).  The similarities are obvious.  All the above references present both persuasion and conformity as changes in overt behavior or belief.

Comparing an early view of conformity with recent research trends in persuasion can draw a closer relationship between conformity pressure and persuasion.  Note that Kelman (1958, 1961) presents three “sub-types” of conformity: compliance, identification, and internalization. Identification and internalization are more properly approached under the rubric of attitude change rather than conformity, which is behavioral acquiescence, and different from attitude change. Agreeing with Kelman, Allen (1965) and Kiesler also (1969) present compliance as a “sub-type” of conformity behavior, often observable through overt behavior change, as is seen with conformity. Compare this with much recent literature approaching compliance--gaining strategies (Miller & Steinberg, 1975; Roloff, 1976; Miller et al., 1977; Sillars, 1980; Cody & McLaughlin, 1980). The general thrust of this research trend is that gaining compliance is actually a function of using persuasive-like strategies in an interpersonal setting (Miller et al., 1977).

But there are subtle and important differences between conformity, compliance, and persuasion. Note first the source of the impetus to change. Many persuasion theorists recognize that, in the strictly persuasive setting, the impetus for change must come from an outside source (Bettinghaus, 1980; Miller, 1972). Ross & Ross (1981) emphasize that persuasion is a method of influencing “others’ thinking, feeling, and/or behavior” (p. 16). Anderson (1978) refers to the communicator who employs “symbolic agencies” to effect the desired voluntary change in a receiver, who is different, of course, from the sender (Table 1) offers a complete conceptual summary).  And Simons (1976) agrees with these researchers by noting it is a persuasive attempt when we seek to “influence others by modifying their attitudes, beliefs, or values” (p. 21).

 

This same locus of source as other than the receiver of the message is seen in approaches to compliance-gaining strategies. Cody & McLaughlin (1980) note that compliance-gaining research seeks to discover how “individuals select a message strategy from a set of available strategies in order to gain compliance from others” (p. 132).  Miller & Steinberg refer to compliance behavior as that which “corresponds to the desires of another” (1975, p. 69). Marwell & Schmitt (1967) identified 16 compliance-gaining techniques used by communicators to gain compliance from another person or other persons.  Miller et al. (1977), speak of compliance-gaining strategies as a “persuader-persuadee” interaction, and Kelman (1961) notes compliance is gained only when an outside source pressures an individual to adjust that individual’s behavior. In conclusion on this issue, then, for the strictly persuasive as well as the compliance-gaining setting, the source of the message is other than the receiver of the attempt to influence the behavior.

Further, however, in order to meld with the strict persuasion/compliance-gaining paradigm, the attempt must not only be from an outside source, but must also be a conscious attempt by the

source to influence the receiver. Simply put, there must be intent to persuade. Relating first to persuasion, Anderson notes that the persuader begins with a desired change, and Boaz & Martin also note this by defining persuasion as “an intentional effort by symbolic means to effect changes in others” (1975, p.2). And Simons, who refers to persuasion as being “designed to influence others” (1976, p. 21), and Bettinghaus, who defines persuasion as a “conscious attempt” (1990, p. 4), support the concept of a pre-determined and intentional purpose as a pre-requisite for identifying an influence attempt as “persuasion.” But both Roloff (1976) and Miller & Steinberg (1975) attach the same requirement for a pre-determined intent to an attempt to gain compliance. Miller & Steinberg identify compliance-gaining behaviors as having a set of “desired outcomes” (p. 68), and Roloff notes that these behaviors are limited by definition to “intentional behavior” (p. 176).

In other words, to fall within the strict parameters of either persuasion or compliance-

 

gaining strategies, these attempts must be from an outside source, and must be conscious,

 

intentional efforts exerting pressure on the receiver to change.

McGuire, however, makes a point supported by other researchers (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Tedeschi, 1972):

 

 

For the situation to be called a “conformity” one in the present sense, it is required that the source give no arguments for his position and that he not give any explicit indication that he expects the subject to agree with him. (McGuire, 1966, pp. 1133-1134)

 

What McGuire says is supported directly by research. In conformity research, subjects are never “pressured” by the group to conform. Wylie (1979) discusses this precise facet of conformity research:

Conformity situations involve procedures in which the subject is simply informed that a certain source holds a certain position, without the subject’s being given explicit indications that he or she is expected to concur. (p. 552)

But Robbins makes a further point. He notes that in a group setting, there is pressure involved: “We can generalize further to say that when an individual’s opinion differs significantly from that of others in his group, he feels extensive pressure to align his opinions to conform with that of the others” (1963, p. 215).

Though the individual does, then, perceive pressure in the group setting, there is an important distinction between the pressure he/she feels and the intentional pressure of a persuader. Note that both Aronson (1980) and Kiesler & Kiesler (1969) speak in terms of “imagined group pressure.” They make an important distinction. The individual does not actually receive, in many cases, direct pressure, nor is the source of the pressure making a conscious, intentional effort to elicit change in the receiver.  Allen (1965) states, “ . . . social pressure is passive, consisting only of the naive subject’s awareness that the other members disagree with him” (p. 133). The position is reiterated by Kiesler: “It is not necessary for ‘group pressure’ to be explicitly transmitted to be effective.  . . .  That the group does not put pressure on the individual to conform is clear” (1969, pp. 236, 240). McGuire suggests that when there is conscious pressure exerted on the individual, the situation ceases to be a conformity pressure setting and begins to be a persuasive one.

Who, then, exerts the pressure to conform?  Krech, et al. (1962) suggest that conformity is the result of the creation of conflict in the mental state of the individual. In order to resolve the conflict, the individual will provide the impetus necessary to conform.  The same idea is suggested by Campbell (1961): A person decides whether or not to conform on the basis of “what weights are given self vs. other when these modes of dispositional acquisition are in conflict” (p. 109).

          The intimation of both researchers is clear. The impetus to change, or conform, is provided by the individual receiving the message.  As Bandura (1978) states, “People are not simply reactors to external influences; through self-generated inducements and self-produced consequences they exercise influence over their own behavior” (p. 23). Compared with the McGuire statement that the group must not consciously present pressure in the conformity setting, the implication is obvious.  A person conforms on the basis of information perceived and the choice between alternatives.  The individual, who must make the choice, would seem to act as the actual source of the pressure.

Look once again, then, at the discussion of persuasion in Miller & Burgoon. They explain the persuasive process in general: “ . . . in a sense, persuasion occurs because the persuadee acts upon himself (italics added), instead of being acted upon by the persuader” (p. 6).  The label given  this process is self-persuasion.

Is there a parallel between conformity and self-persuasion?  First, look more closely at the process of self-persuasion. Miller (1972) says the term “self-persuasion” can probably be applied to any attitudinal or behavioral change.  Others support the thought.  “In a sense, most persuasion is primarily self-persuasion” (Hopper, 1976, p. 136).  Bitzer suggests that Aristotle recognized the importance of self-persuasion centuries ago. 

According to Aristotle, the enthymeme is “the substance of rhetorical persuasion” (Rhetoric, 1354a14).  But, as Bitzer presents it, the enthymeme “has the virtue of being

self-persuasive . . . the audience itself helps construct the proofs by which it is persuaded” (Bitzer, 1959, p. 408).  Fisher updates this Aristotelian view when he states, “the act of persuasion is ultimately an act of self-persuasion on the part of the persuadee.”  He continues by suggesting that we view the persuasion process as a “perceiving receiver who filters manipulative messages and thereby controls his (own) responses to the persuasive attempts” (Fisher, 1978, pp. 188-189).  Perloff and Brock (1980) complete the relationship when they note that “individuals are active participants in the persuasion process,” and conclude that persuasion occurs because, “In effect, individuals persuade themselves to adopt the position advocated by the communicator” (p. 69).

           Though these theories establish that most, if not all, persuasion is at least primarily self-persuasion, examination of other research establishes a close, if not direct, relationship

between self-persuasion and the process of conformity.  Zimbardo, et al. (1967) help establish the relationship.  In a study designed to discover if effective communication could produce both

public conformity and private acceptance, the researchers concluded that the communicator who advocates public compliance to behavior discrepant from a person’s attitudes (eating fried grasshoppers) could also influence attitude. Further, and to emphasize the relationship between self-persuasion and conformity, this could be done “without specifically communicating persuasive arguments and conclusions” (p. 253).

            Noting that pressure to conform as well as to change an attitude is not necessarily directly applied to the subject, it must be concluded the actual pressure to change came from other than the source of the message itself.  The suggestion here, of course, is that the pressure results from a form of self-persuasion, which leads to both conformity and persuasion.

   The relationship between conformity and self-persuasion is made complete by Kiesler (1969) and Fisher (1976).  “Though it seems clear that disagreement with others, whether in behavior or attitudes, produces forces upon the individual to change the discrepant attitude or behavior” (Kiesler, 1969, p. 240), it is nevertheless the individual who both perceives the group pressure and ultimately chooses a course of action.  And Fisher not only supports the view that conformity may indeed be a form of self-persuasion, but he also recognizes the need to overcome the problems present in current theoretical views of the social influence process: “one way to overcome conceptual problems is to conceive of the social influence process as inherently one of self-persuasion” (1978, p.189).  Based on this discussion, then, it seems possible to state that conformity is indeed a form of self-persuasion.

 

Conformity as Self-persuasion

A secondary, though still important, question remains unanswered.  How does this process of self-persuasion, which undoubtedly has much to do with a person’s decision to conform or to resist, work? If, as established earlier, the process of conformity is actually a process of self-persuasion, what actually occurs causing someone to take the step of behavioral change and act counter to previously stated attitudes or beliefs?  Though it is not the primary focus of this work to attempt to develop any new theory of cognitive responding or restructuring, it would seem necessary to make the attempt to identify what is occurring within the individual who is placed in the conformity setting.

If conformity is in fact a form of persuasion through self-persuasion, it seems logical that people would attempt to persuade themselves using the same methods they use in their attempts to persuade others.  In other words, we would apply the same arguments, and seek the same outcomes, from ourselves in the self-persuasive process that we apply to others in the persuasive (or compliance-gaining) process.

But how do we persuade others?  Kelman (1961) refers to the process as one of “gaining compliance,” and a significant body of research (Marwell and Schmitt, 1967; Miller, et al., 1977; McLaughlin, Cody & Robey, 1980; Cody & McLaughlin, 1980) has addressed the issue.  As noted earlier in the literature review, compliance-gaining suggests that, as O’Keefe & Delia state, individuals construct a series of “strategic communications” which are “designed to elicit desired responses from a listener” (1981, p. 231).  Miller & Steinberg refer to these strategies as “patterns of communicative control,” and note that all people have them: 

 

Each individual has a personal repertory of control messages, a personal way of

transmitting these messages, and a personal way of reacting to the responses he or she gets

from other communicators. (1975, p. 92)

 

      We all, then, have a developed “bank” of communicative strategies, which we use while attempting to “persuade” or gain compliance from others.  But do we use these strategies on ourselves in the self--persuasive process?  Note first that Miller et al. refer to a “specific ‘package’ of message content which is necessary before the individual can develop the operational message indicants of the various strategies” (1977, p. 39).  McLaughlin, Cody & Robey (1980) note that these message package strategies are used for not only gaining compliance but also for resisting compliance.  These researchers emphasize that both the receiver and the sender are “active” and aware in the persuasion process, and go through a complex series of thoughts designed to select the strategies that might be used to resist compliance gaining attempts and to gain compliance for that resistance.  And Perloff and Brock emphasize the point that people are totally involved, and hence aware, during the persuasion process:

 

. . . individuals are active participants in the persuasive process who attempt to relate message elements to their existing repertoires of information. In doing so, these individuals may consider materials not actually contained in the persuasive messages. (1980, p. 69)

 

The implications here are important.  McLaughlin, Cody & Robey seem to suggest that strategies for gaining compliance are used in a variety of ways, and for a variety of purposes. And Perloff & Brock are stating that when a person reacts to a persuasive attempt, they do so on the basis of information not necessarily provided by the sender of the message.  In the self-persuasive setting, it would seem logical to assume that the “other information” could be strategies applied to ourselves for self-persuasion.  In other words, during that intermediate step between receiving an attempt from outside and actually making a choice known, there is the step of actually making the choice, and this choice is made on the basis of the application of the same strategies to ourselves that we apply to others.

But what strategies do we use?  Marwell & Schmitt (1967) presented an important attempt in identifying actual strategies used for gaining compliance when they discovered 16 strategies usually applied, depending on the situation, in attempts to gain compliance from others.

These 16 were actually grouped together in five factors representing the strategies that might be used: rewarding activity, punishing activity, expertise, activation of personal commitments, and activation of impersonal commitments.  In a later study, Miller, et al. (1977) sought to simplify that classification and suggested the strategies were actually grouped into a less complex (than 16) typology.  Depending on the situation, they suggest, there is a high probability that people will select one of a more limited number of types. Their research suggests that in the situation likely to be identified as a short-term group setting, there are possibly six forms of strategies applied: threat, promise, liking, expertise, altruism, and alter-casting.  Simply put, the suggestion here is that, in the conformity setting, a person facing pressure is likely to make a choice for behavior on the basis of one or more of these six strategies, applying to him/herself a strategy that finds basis in these six types.  It can be concluded this typology is applicable to the conformity setting as well as the persuasive or compliance-gaining situation.

  Research question

Though the general purpose of this work is to develop a new approach to operationalizing conformity for research, it does seem necessary to at least begin the process of applying that approach through research.  Hence, a brief project is offered to answer the research question that develops as a result of the preceding discussion: since the conformity setting is essentially one of self-persuasion, do individuals apply the same strategies to self in the self--persuasion/conformity setting that are applied to others in the general persuasion or compliance-gaining setting?

Method

Subjects were 128 undergraduate students at a medium-sized mid-western university. They were asked to participate in a ‘general’ university survey designed to identify student attitudes on a number of topics of importance to all at this university.”  The true nature of the study was concealed from the subjects, and the experiment was conducted at the campus radio station, supposedly because the station was working with the office of student affairs in conducting the “survey.”

Subjects were instructed to meet with the experimenter at the station, and were placed in a group with three confederates.  During this time, attitudes on five topics of importance to the university community were measured, and the “group” invited to discuss their opinions.

Pressure to conform was applied using a discussion method originally used by Meade & Barnard (1973) and refined by Green (1984).  Beginning with the subject, each member of the group was asked his/her response to each of the attitude scales on each of the five topics. Following the subject, each confederate gave a response based on the response of the subject, which was opposite the attitude of the subject, but in agreement with the other group members. After a brief discussion (confederates were previously told not to directly pressure or argue with the subject, but did support the other confederates), each member of the group was given an opportunity to change his/her opinion on the subject.  Confederates were asked first, and did not change in the direction of the subject.  The subject was then offered the opportunity to “adjust” the previously stated opinion in any manner they wished, and the changes noted.

        Following the actual discussion, each subject met with the experimenter for a debriefing period during which an instrument designed to “measure” conformity as self-persuasion was administered.  During this period other measures were administered to validate the perception of pressure, perceptions of the purpose of the study, and other validity/reliability concerns.

Since the true purpose of the study was not revealed at this time, a later meeting was held, and all subjects invited to discuss the study. Though all did not attend, those who did not were contacted and invited to meet with the experimenter at a later time.

 

Instrument

The instrument designed to measure “what went on in the mind” of the subjects, and designed to provide information used to answer the research question, was a Likert-type scale using the items developed by Miller, et al. (1977), and designed to discover what types of compliance-gaining strategies are use in the persuasive setting.  Using these concepts (and the six strategies noted earlier:  threat, promise, liking, expertise, altruism, and alter-casting) provided the information necessary to at least approach the exploratory nature of the research

questions related to discovering if the subject does in fact apply those same strategies to self in the conformity settings. If a person does, it can be determined that conformity can be supported as a “self-persuasive activity.”

The seven strategies used in the Construction of the instrument were:

1.       I behaved the way I did because I wanted the other members of the group to like me.

2.       I behaved the way I did because the other members of the group knew more than I did.

3.        I behaved the way I did because I was afraid the members of group would reject me.

4.       I behaved the way I did because ‘the group needed me to agree with them.

5.         I behaved the way I did because a good group member should support the group.

6.        I behaved the way I did because I would have been a poor group member if I had not.

7.       I behaved the way I did because the group would accept me if I acted correctly.

 

Results

The instrument provided information used in a multiple regression analysis of the seven strategies.  The stepwise regression used amount of conformity change as the dependent variable and the individual strategies as the independent variable (Table 2).  The assumption was that strategy would be directly related to response.  By asking if the subject was aware of a strategy, and then comparing that to the responses it was felt the relationship between self-persuasion and action could be determined, and thus an answer for the research question found.

    As the results show, the value of R increased from a low of .296 with one independent variable to a high of .430 with all independent variables entered the regression equation.

             There is a concomitant increase in R2 from .088 to .163. Though it might be tempting to point out that the entire set of variables accounts for substantially more of the variance in the degree of conformity than any one single variable, it is necessary to note that the first four variables account for .421 of the R and .177 of the R2, with the final three variables accounting for much less variance.  It is also important to note differences among Beta weights, which suggests that some strategies seem to have greater impact on the subsequent degree of conformity behavior than others.

 

Discussion

Though conformity can be viewed as a form of self-persuasion, this concept will only be useful to the extent the researcher can operationalize it and apply it in a direct research setting. This asks us to attempt to operationalize a cognitive process, or identify (at least partially) the thought process in this influence situation.  To this end, a research question was presented based on the conceptualization of conformity as a form of self-persuasion.  This question was designed to discover if it is possible to begin to discover “what goes on in the mind” of the person receiving conformity pressure.  Since the conformity setting can be described as a persuasive

(i.e., a self-persuasive) situation, it was previously suggested that the individual may apply to “self” the same persuasive strategies used in attempting to persuade others. Noting that Miller et al. (1977) had developed a series of such strategies, a device for measuring the possible application in the conformity setting was administered during debriefing.

A multiple regression analysis suggested the strategies selected for this research do have some value as predictors of two important activities. Initially, there is reason to accept the strategies adapted from Miller et al. (1977) as being at least representative of the type of “strategy” a person might consider (and subsequently apply to self) during the cognitive processes that occur when faced with influence pressure from others. Together the seven strategies accounted for .18 of the variance (though, as noted earlier, the final three strategies accounted for much less than the other four).  Simply put, then, the answer to the question if it is possible to “identify what goes on in the mind” of the person under influence pressure seems to be positive. Obviously, not all variance is accounted for in this research, but enough is evidenced to suggest there is some validity to these strategies as predictors of what cognitive processes occurred when faced with influence pressures.

But the particular strategies used here also seem to have some value as predictors of the subsequent behavior, at least in this present research.  Given the nature of the variance, it is possible to say the strategies, particularly when used as a group, will allow           some general predictions regarding subsequent conformity.  But given that the over-all findings were at what might be optimistically described as a moderate range, it is safe to suggest that although the subjects are aware of some “self-arguments” occurring in the mind, the strategies used here are probably not the only cognitive processes involved.  Given the availability of a wide number of cognitive processing/responding theories, it is important to recognize the “beginning” nature of the step taken here, although the findings in this brief research should provide directions for interesting future research.

 

 

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