Social development is an illusive term, in both what it is perceived to mean and how the process works. Streeten and Javed (1978) describe the purpose of social development as being "to raise the sustainable level of living of the masses of poor people as rapidly as is feasible and to provide all human beings with the opportunity to develop to their fullest potential." For her part, Louise G. White (1987) avers that "a development program is one that is designed to (1) carry out a nation’s development goals; (2) introduce change in a society or community to increase its productive or organizational capacity; and (3) improve the quality of peoples’ lives, including improvements in the well-being of the poor." Drawing from these and other notions, social development approach may be thought of as a means of meeting human needs and creating a process that will promote economic enterprise in a just way.

The policy was a high priority of the United Nations from the very beginning and the organization made great efforts to implement it. It was formulated in the post-World War II context of lesser-developed countries (LDCs) being released from their colonial status. The internal conditions of these countries had left them unable to respond to changes in domestic and international markets and it was hoped that social development programs would improve their capabilities. The Ford Foundation was the first major funder for the UN’s development projects, though the World Bank shortly thereafter funded 10 development projects (Rothman). India was the first country to access the Ford Foundation initiative and was the most involved in how it would be applied on the ground.

By the 1960s, many countries in the Southern Hemisphere, Asia and Africa were utilizing the concepts conceived and implemented in the United Nations’ various projects to further community development. That said, the decision by the United Nations and the developed countries to implement social and economic development strategies was not entirely altruistic. The history of the relationships between developed countries and LDCs demonstrates that the former often were acting cynically out of self-interest.

Social development processes typically are implemented by a LDC working in conjunction with either a benefactor-developed country or a United Nations Commission. It is expected that social development processes will benefit both underdeveloped and developed countries. Benefactors have believed that improving the economic and social position of the underdeveloped countries will fast forward them somewhat into the modernization process so that it will create a better market for its own advanced exports. Western nations assumed LDCs were modernized once their economic and political structures resembled those of the industrialized countries, they used technology and were socially flexible, that is, interacting with the changes from modernization (Melkote, 1991). The assistance provided in the name of social development can include monetary help; new knowledge in the fields of science, health, and agriculture; and the know-how and practical experience provided by consultants competent in these fields.

Assistance is given on the assumption that LDCs lack industrial infrastructure, a motivated citizenry, and knowledge of the industrial world, though the reality may be that economic conditions are the only overriding factor behind these countries laggard status (Melkote, 1991). The government of an LDC targeted for social development measures is encouraged or supported in its effort to meet the basic human needs of its populace by instituting social policies and program that upgrade community life and provide for economic expansion that will nurture domestic industry. The introduction of the development process gives rise to a new entrepreneurial spirit that in turn leads to the creation of new enterprises (Servon, 1999). As a consequence, the process thus encourages citizens to become involved in the institutional changes that will affect the economic, political, and social dimensions of their lives (Gerson, 2000). As John Lewis of the Overseas Development Council points out, economic growth that generates goods and services, makes life more equitable for those at the lower end of the economic scale, and makes a nation self sufficient in its ability to receive and pay for goods are substantial results of importance for everyone (Lewis, 1986).

As noted above, the background out of which these strategies were developed is the colonial past that many of these LDCs have. The conditions of exploitation and oppression that marked that experience are what created their presumed backward state. Colonialism was the dominant factor that shaped the birth of these nations. Their colonial experiences were long enough to have altered all of the governmental functions needed for development (So, 1990). Domination stripped many LDCs of their abilities to operate independently. Furthermore, the power exerted by a conquering country deprives a weaker country of access to its own resources.

It must be borne in mind that many LDCs had rich advanced culture prior to the imposition of colonial status. Although the goal of helping a LDC to upgrade its infrastructure and agricultural output or offering joint industrial ventures may be a worthwhile one regardless of the mixed motives behind it, any success in an LDC is overshadowed by the value placed on those results in the eyes of the developed world. Successes can be erased if a developed country determines that the new developments in a LDC threaten its own economy, policies, or national effort and then acts to preserve its own interests at the expense of those of the LDC. Indeed, LDC members of the United Nations have in many cases come to believe that the developed world has imposed conditions of dependency or underdevelopment to satisfy its needs rather than the LDCs (Weede, 1996). The process of social development that is now underway represents an international effort to make restitution to LDCs, even as some continue the relationships they have with their former colonial masters or other dominant countries. The environment surrounding this process will remain a fluid one as both developed and lesser-developed nations search for ways to make social development resolve some of the inequities that are a legacy of the past.

Puerto Rico’s Experience with the United States

Puerto Rico became a colony of Spain in 1493. The United States’ victory over Spain in the Spanish-American War of 1898 resulted in the occupation of Puerto Rico, as well as its neighbor, Cuba. Initially, Puerto Ricans were greatly relieved to be free of Spain, but soon found that the shift to United States’ control was a mixed blessing (Martin, 1990). Under Spanish rule, the Puerto Rican elite colluded with their conquerors to carve out and consolidate over time a small niche of independent power. However, the consolidation process had barely been completed when the outcome of the 1898 war left Puerto Rico with having to cope with a new colonial overlord.

Under United States sovereignty, new laws and regulations, passed by the United States Congress would make Puerto Rico economically dependent on its new colonial master. These laws placed restrictions on the import and export of goods from Puerto Rico, making the United States the exclusive partner for such arrangements. The relationship was similar to that which existed when Puerto Rico was a Spanish possession (Dietz, 1986). Puerto Rico’s economy remained volatile throughout the early period of United States domination. The Island was beset by political crises and market fluctuations that ran from extreme to extreme through the 1930s. Across these decades, the economy shifted from being an agriculturally based to industrial-based one, though drought and hurricanes produced significant losses in the still important sugar cane and tobacco industries. Unemployment ran high and the United States government offered only weak promises of assistance despite the efforts to obtain more by the last of the governors appointed from the Mainland, Rexford Tugwell (1941-1946). When Tugwell’s term ended, he was replaced by Jesus T. Pinero, appointed by President Harry S.Truman to be a temporary resident commissioner until elections were held in 1948 (Dietz, 1986). The dismal economic conditions persisted. Luis Munoz Marin (1948-1964) the first elected populist governor and his political party, the Popular Democrats (PPD), determined that seeking private capital from the Mainland would enable the Island to free itself from its uncertain economic situation. As a part of this effort, they also decided the Island’s political status would likewise have to be addressed. The relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States remained problematic politically; the solution proposed by Tugwell and developed by Munoz was to place the island under commonwealth status. The status limited Puerto Rico’s freedom to act independently on legislative and judicial matters and put the Island into a category between statehood and independence. President Truman signed it into law in 1950.

In the literature, Wolfe (1996) describes social development as social change. The level of commitment to change rests with the degree to which any country will commit itself to social development varies on the basis of conditions in each and every country. The degree to which there is concern over social conditions will necessarily be affected by the dominant societal norms of the country in question. In Puerto Rico, social conditions were quite volatile and chaotic in mid-century as the Island shifted from an agricultural to an industrial economy. This produced great concern among the populace, whose desire for relief from poverty and the capricious social and political conditions gave them an incentive to approve the changes Munoz presented in Operation Bootstrap, discussed below. Thus, the Puerto Rican citizenry put their faith in Munoz’s proposals and were ready to move forward with the new plans, which created a favorable environment for social development to take place.

Culture and ideology are critical factors in the social development process. Ideology translates to knowledge and is a critical element of social control. However, as noted by Miles (1992) and Freire (1981), one does not need a formal education to liberate the thought process. Speaking from the cultural perspective, the seeming luxury of the changes in the economic conditions and opportunities for employment were so new in this underdeveloped country that people were luxuriating in more equitable wages.

Operation Bootstrap was produced by Luis Munoz, working with Economic Development Director Teodoro Moscoso and the PPD. Launched in 1948, Operation Bootstrap was a social development project intended to attract private capital from the United States to Puerto Rico. It was hoped that the plan would create new jobs and opportunities for the Island’s inhabitants. While Operation Bootstrap included the promotion of social justice in its goals, the emphasis was economic development. In fact, the goal of obtaining social justice for the Island’s inhabitants eventually was lost owing to the strength of the need to promote economic growth and market the Island’s advantages so as to improve economic conditions. The Puerto Rican government advertised its federal tax-free status in order to attract corporations to the Island and later added tax-free status from insular taxes as well. To accomplish this, the government organized an agency called FOMENTO (Economic Development Administration) to market Puerto Rico to industry. All companies would remain tax free from 1947 to 1959 and then be partially tax-free until 1962. Ultimately, 83 corporations took advantage of the program (Dietz, 1986). Neither Munoz nor Moscoso planned for nor could predict what the consequences of their initiative would be. Although Puerto Rico’s colonial status was an inarguable fact and both men were aware that political and economic power still resided on the Mainland and not with Puerto Ricans, in the context of their times they saw getting the support of Mainland corporations as having positive consequences for Puerto Rico (Dietz, 1986).

However, as suggested by social development theory, in their strategic approach they failed to take into account how such factors as the goals and priorities they set, resource availability, and the institutional linkages that would come with the introduction of Mainland investment would interact with one another and the impact this would have. Although Operation Bootstrap encompassed a broad range of directions and instrumental approaches, it appears that they failed to come to agreement over what benefits Mainland investment could bring the Island and how they should be introduced in the discussions they had over the details of the approaches to be followed. They apparently did not take into account the possibility that the strategy would have multiplier effects, or just how wide-ranging its impact would be on the Island’s people and environment. Unforeseen consequences were the depletion of resources and the loss of corporations after the tax-free status ended. Fomento initially included low wages in its business strategy, but the Island labor unions pressed for higher wages. Mainland unions that feared a loss of jobs to the Island joined them. As for Mainland companies, they were not interested in paying more wages because their manufactured products were being exported right back to the Mainland. Ultimately, the companies were to find that even if they had wanted to hire Puerto Ricans, the Island people did not possess the qualifications they needed for technical positions in their companies.

Meanwhile, the PPD was hemmed in by the limitations imposed by the Island’s colonial status. This prevented the party from operating with greater autonomy in its efforts as the government party to pursue an economic policy that would alleviate the negative consequences of the Mainland companies’ operations. The Munoz government was able to effect peripheral land reforms by reorganizing absentee owned sugar cane businesses, but Puerto Rican business interests resisted the government’s efforts to lay the groundwork for the creation of such basic industries as cement, shoes production, glass manufacturing, and paper pulp production, believing that the social change that would come with such industrialization would upset the status quo. Additional resistance came from Mainland companies, many of whom worked to sabotage these programs out of concern that they decrease their businesses.

The key components of social development are inter-related. This fact produces multiplier effects. Changing goals and priorities in one area will change allocation of resources and institutional linkages in others (Weede, 1996). On the Island, the changes that resulted from the entry of Mainland companies into the economy ultimately created dislocations and unemployment in local industries. Initially, those local government-operated enterprises that could service the Island and Mainland companies experienced modest growth. While some of the labor force was able to move from older industries into the new ones that arose, the Mainland companies did little hiring of Puerto Ricans and so high unemployment continued.

The scope, direction, and quality of the social development process will also be shaped by the social policies pursued by a government and the dominant societal values. The policies that govern social development require pursuing strategies in four major areas: income distribution, popular participation, human development and social integration. Of these four, it is popular, or citizen, participation that probably draws the most controversy in any country. Popular participation can be perceived as being of the greatest threat in those countries where the distance between the haves and the have-nots is the most considerable. In LDCs, participation can awaken the conscience of a populace to the inequities of the human condition and engender an attitude of nonconformity (Freire, 1981).

In Puerto Rico, one example of how demands for popular participation can be thwarted is apparent in the case was the decision of the major labor union, Confederacion General de Trabajadores (CGT), the Island’s largest labor union. The CGT sought to represent all of Puerto Rico’s labor and be the voice of the working people to government. Munoz wanted their support as well as to control the labor movement because he wanted support for the PPD’s industrial program. So he placed the union and the PPD in equally important governmental positions. Although this worked the CGT and the PPD had major relationship disagreements, followed by a split of CGT into two unions (March 1945). The union soon fractured into a number of smaller organizations. After the disagreements that arose between the original CGT and the PPD proved to be contentious, Munoz blocked legislation that would have increased the power of the labor movement and said that he would only work with the PPD (Dietz, 1986). This effectively smothered popular participation in the government. Grassroots voices are an important component in achieving social development (Marsigilia, 1991); Munoz’s action eliminated a powerful one in Puerto Rico. Melkote (1991) has commented that popular participation can be seen as threatening in developed countries and is frequently sabotaged by the dominant power. In Puerto Rico, it was the governor who did it to his own people.

With respect to income distribution, while Operation Bootstrap did produce some change in this area, it was insufficient to meet the levels required for successful social development. The Island’s government did make improvements in housing, education, and the transportation and banking infrastructure, however, it was unable to effect thoroughgoing redistribution of income given the constraints imposed by the Island’s colonial relationship with the United States.

As for human development, achieving this goal can also be a volatile process. Improvements in education, health care and other amenities had a significantly positive outcome on quality of life for Puerto Ricans and increased the number of skilled and educated individuals. However, the Island’s political and economic conditions continued to limit the opportunities for employment and occupational advancement. This factor would eventually spur migration to the Mainland by people in search of better opportunities.

Finally, the element of social integration must be analyzed in the context of the decades prior to the implementation of Operation Bootstrap. Social integration is defined here as the encouragement of a mixture of citizens between countryside and city which occurred in Puerto Rico when the consequences of industrialization caused a loss of work in the countryside and people moved to the cities. With the continued high level of unemployment, emigration of citizens to the Mainland was encouraged. The example for this is that beginning early in the 20^th century, it became quite apparent to the United States’ Department of the Interior and Puerto Rico’s appointed governors that the Island was overpopulated and its people underemployed. Citizens were encouraged to seek employment on the Mainland. Also, companies were experiencing a shortage of manpower because of World War II and began recruitment on the Island for employment on the Mainland. Although movement to the Mainland was slow at first, rising levels of education and an ever more apparent lack of jobs commensurate to the skills being acquired resulted in a gradual awakening of interest in moving to the Mainland. Puerto Ricans’ status as United States citizens gave them the freedom to go back and forth, and more and more would take advantage of it. This in turn led to the creation of Puerto Rican communities on the Mainland, particularly in New York City. The strong cultural orientation of Puerto Ricans led those who followed in turn to seek out their countrymen. As a result, many Puerto Ricans found themselves with family and community in both locations. While this made it easy to move back and forth, economic pressures led most to take up residence on the Mainland. As a result, unemployment became less of an issue on the Island, only to be replaced by brain drain.

As was outlined in the previous section, some elements of social development as implemented under the leadership of Munoz, Moscoso and the PPD on Puerto Rico were successful, but it was not because of Operation Bootstrap. Where they were successful was in their political decision to put into practice social development theory and creating the environment for economic conditions to be transformed and social relations to change (David, 2000). If one interprets the definition of social development as representing a means for equitably meeting human needs while creating a process that promotes economic enterprise in a just way, it could be said that if anything, Operation Bootstrap failed to achieve the half that became its primary purpose, economic development (e.g., offering employment, increasing per capita income, and bringing permanent business to the island). A variety of social gains were achieved—the development of public sector employment, the emigration of surplus workers to the Mainland, and the acquisition of federal government transfers in 1970 to both the people (Social Security, federal pensions and food assistance) and the Government of Puerto Rico (commonwealth departments of Education, Social Services, Health and Unemployment Insurance Fund)—only after it had become apparent that Operation Bootstrap had not achieved its developer's goals.

In the longer run, the island’s government has had to take on heavier debt to pay for welfare and market its workforce. Achieving the goal of a capitalist economy remains in progress. The social development experience of Puerto Rico was not unusual as documented by the LDCs that conducted projects relying on this process.

Overall, Puerto Rico’s social development experience has not been unusual, as can be seen in comparison with that of the many LDCs that have conducted projects relying on this process. Social development was attempted in many countries during 1950s and the 1960s, but overall it was not a successful venture. Many observers today believe that it has run its course. However, the concepts can work, if time is given to laying the foundation. Planners have to determine whether or not the project meets community needs and then assess whether the citizenry being affected will share its goals and follow through on implementing the process to achieve them. Planners must ensure that the process is simple enough to involve everyone and then will produce tangible, positive results for them. All aspects of planning, including determining the kind of staff required and ensuring that it receives adequate support, are critical to the overall success of a social development scheme (Rothman, 2000). Thus, Puerto Rico’s experience can be seen as not atypical, in that it required a stronger foundation, better coordination and fuller collaboration than was originally conceived.

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