Northwest Airlines (NWA), founded in 1926 by Colonel Lewis Brittin as Northwest Airways, was a Michigan corporation with operations based at Speedway Flying Field. This is the site of today's Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport, and home of the airline's world headquarters (NWA Facts, 1999). It has operated continuously under the same name longer than any other U.S. airline. Similar to other airline companies established in the 1920s, Northwest Airways was initially in the business of hauling mail under contract to the U.S. Postal Service. The inaugural mail flights began on October 1, 1926 and were flown with two rented, open-cockpit biplanes. The first ticketed passenger service began the following year on July 5, 1927 when Byron Webster paid $40 for a 122 hour one-way flight from Minneapolis/St. Paul to Chicago. Northwest Airways became an international airline on February 1, 1928 with weekly Minneapolis/St. Paul service to Winnipeg, Canada and on September 1, 1928 began the first U.S. air-rail coordinated service. Following the passage of the Black-McKellar Act, which revised the handling of mail contracts, the carrier was re-incorporated under Minnesota law on April 16, 1934, and its name changed to Northwest Airlines.

In the years before World War II, Northwest continued its route expansion, and its stock was publicly traded for the first time in February 1941. During the war, Northwest carried out 11 major government wartime assignments, including a military cargo route to Canada, Alaska, and the Aleutian Islands. The airline's cold weather experience and its predominance in the region made it the logical choice. The Army's Air Transport Command signed a contract with Northwest, and on March 29, 1942, Northwest started regular scheduled service from Minneapolis to Fairbanks, Alaska, becoming the second domestic airline to begin overseas operations.

When the war ended, Northwest lobbied the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to award them carrier rights to fly to the Orient, and on July 15, 1947 service began from Minneapolis/St. Paul via Anchorage and Shemya, Alaska, to Tokyo, Seoul, Shanghai and Manila. As an advertising and marketing scheme, Northwest added orient to its name, creating Northwest Orient Airlines, although the official name remained Northwest Airlines. (Smith, 1986)

In July 1950, hostilities in Korea forced suspension of commercial service to Seoul and Northwest was subsequently selected by the U.S. Government to be the prime contractor for the Korean War airlift. In January 1955, Northwest voluntarily became the first airline to operate without government subsidy on trans-pacific and United States-Alaska routes.

In 1969, Northwest entered the jet age with its first turbo-prop airliners. In 1968, Northwest led the U.S. airline industry in net profit for the first time. It again led the industry in 1969, 1970 and 1975.

In 1978, the economic regulation of U.S. airlines was abolished by the Airline Deregulation Act, enabling them to enter and exit domestic routes without government approval. For many of the large airlines, the competition proved too fierce and large amounts of revenue were lost. Northwest, however, was well established in its various markets and for the most part remained unchallenged. During the first full year following the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act, Northwest entered more than 20 new U.S. domestic routes.

In March 1979, Northwest entered the trans-Atlantic passenger market by launching service to Copenhagen, Denmark and Stockholm, Sweden. In May 1984, Northwest shareholders approved the creation of Northwest Airlines (NWA) Inc, a Delaware corporation, as the holding company for Northwest Airlines. In December 1984, Northwest and Mesaba Airlines announced a regional airline marketing partnership, the first Northwest Airlink agreement.

In 1986, Northwest purchased its regional competitor, Republic Airlines. Initially, the Civil Aeronautics Board was concerned that Northwest would operate monopolies in too many markets, but ultimately, the merger was approved. Northwest's work force expanded overnight from fewer than 17,000 personnel to more than 33,000.

In June 1989, Wings Holdings acquired Northwest in a $3.65 billion-dollar leveraged buyout. Wings Holdings is an investments group that includes Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM). Following this acquisition, Northwest became a privately held corporation for the first time since 1941 (Smith, 1986).

In January 1990, Northwest announced a $422 million program to upgrade service and regain customer preference. Northwest's poor service and on-time record in previous years led to dissatisfied business travelers who generously bestowed the nickname "North-worst." As part of the upgrade/rebuild program, on-time arrivals were guaranteed at 18 southern airports and backed-up by free round-trip tickets if flights were late. For the next several years, Northwest had the best on-time performance record among the seven largest U.S. airlines. In November 1990, John Dasburg, the executive vice president of finance and administration, was named president and chief executive officer. In 1991, Gary L. Wilson was elected co-chairman.

In 1991, Northwest and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines launched their first joint service, twice-weekly flights between Minneapolis and Amsterdam. Breaking additional new territory, in April 1991 Northwest was the first U.S. airline to fly over the Soviet Union since World War II, and the first U.S. airline to fly into Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam War.

In 1991, Northwest suffered both business and image setbacks when they faced the conviction of some Northwest pilots for flying under the influence of alcohol, and a runway collision between two Northwest jets (Curtis, 1997). Additionally, they were bombarded by financial trouble with rising fuel costs, declining traffic emanating from a weakening economy, and recession and war in the Middle East exacerbated oil price wars. A Minnesota legislative committee voted in favor of $835 million-dollar incentive financing package for Northwest to expand its maintenance operations in Minnesota.

During 1992, Northwest launched an overhaul of its domestic and international route system to focus on profitable flying and its strategic assets. Most non-hub domestic routes were abandoned to shift resources into hub flying. Australian flights were terminated to allow greater focus on Japan, and non-strategic trans-Atlantic routes were suspended to allow more trans-Atlantic flights from the Detroit and Amsterdam hubs.

In January 1993, the U.S. Department of Transportation approved the Northwest/KLM commercial cooperation and integration agreement under a grant of antitrust immunity. They now joined in creating a unified global airline system, the first of its kind in the world. In August 1993, Northwest completed a voluntary financial restructuring, including a three-year wage reduction agreement with employees, an employee stock ownership program, and a rescheduling of financial obligations to lenders and major vendors (Kepos, 1992).

In August 1995, Northwest and Alaska Airlines announced a comprehensive marketing and code sharing agreement. Customers would enjoy the benefits of a coordinated route system that covered the United States, Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, Asia, and Europe. In February 1996, Northwest claimed a sixth consecutive first place finish for on-time performance among the seven largest airlines. In 1996 and 1997, Northwest created new marketing alliances with Air China, Jet Airways of India, and Norway's largest regional carrier. In October 1997, Northwest ranked second in a Fortune magazine survey of the world's most admired companies.

In 1993, Northwest's net earnings were $964.2 million over 1992 reported earnings. In 1994 Northwest recorded a 1994 net profit of $295.5 million, leading all U.S. airlines in net profitability. In 1997, Northwest announced year-end earnings $536.1 million, the largest annual net income in company history. In 1998, Northwest reported record profits $597 million, breaking previous year's records for the largest net income in company history.

Airline Negotiations

All airline negotiations are governed by the 1926 Railway Labor Act (RLA). It is not uncommon for labor negotiations under the Railway Labor Act to take two or more years to complete and contracts governed by the Railway Labor Act do not expire. Negotiations do not even begin under the Railway Labor Act until the contract becomes amendable. During the amendable period, the Company is obligated to abide by the terms of the existing contract and to continue to pay its employees in accordance with the contract's terms and conditions. Employees are obligated to similarly abide by the terms of the existing contract and to continue to perform their jobs fully.

During Railway Labor Act negotiations (called the status-quo), the contract and all of its terms remain in place and employees are legally prohibited from engaging in picketing (other than informational picketing), strikes, or any type of job action until released to do so by the National Mediation Board (NMB). If the National Mediation Board decides formally that an impasse has been reached, a 30-day "cooling off" period shall take place during which time negotiations are to continue. (Labor, 1998). A federal mediator can be requested to supervise negotiations between the two parties. The National Mediation Board appoints this individual. In the case of the Northwest

International Association of Machinist (IAM) represented employees, their contract became amendable on October 2, 1996.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, companies sought outside management instead of promoting from within the company. This thought process was applied at Northwest. Outside management was preferred because these new managers would not be as sympathetic to the unions and the workers, which they represent. Management from outside is generally more focused on the corporate bottom line. Increased company profits lead to bigger dividends for the shareholders. Management, which demonstrates profitable performance, is generally rewarded with sizable bonuses. While this theory seems logical in our capitalist society, the average worker seldom benefits in this environment. Instead, the workers are often asked to make concessions to boost company profitability or reduce losses. This was the case at Northwest during the period following deregulation and the economic recession of the 1980s. When Northwest showed sizable profits in the mid-to-late 1990s, the unions sought to recoup some of the concessions they had made to help Northwest stay in business just a few years before. At Northwest, the unions and management were strongly divided and viewed each other as the enemy. This general distrust further weakened the company=s financial health as worker productivity declined dramatically. The unions had to do something to break the hostilities that existed between the workers and management.

The roots of Northwest Airlines' current labor crisis go back to when the company was on the brink of bankruptcy in 1991. The airline was going broke and turned to taxpayers for help. Governor Arne Carlson led the fight for the state of Minnesota to give Northwest an $835 million-dollar aid package. In return for the state money, Northwest=s chairman Al Checci promised to build two maintenance facilities in northern Minnesota, bringing high-paying union jobs to the area.

This fix was certainly not permanent; however, Northwest did open the facilities in 1996, but with 500 fewer employees than promised. The airline continued to lose money. In 1992, Northwest lost $902 million and the airline needed help once again. This time Northwest turned to its unions who agreed to concessions and wage cuts. These wage reductions represented a substantial sacrifice by Northwest employees and were critical to the company's return to profitability. In return for the $886 million in concessions, union members were given stock and 3 positions on Northwest's 15-member board of directors.

Bitterness surfaced over the concessions that were made in previous negotiations and remained at the heart of current negotiations between management and the pilots association. Northwest claimed the pilots had received raises 6.5 percent every year between 1992 and 1997. However, the controversy was fueled over the pilots= disagreements. The primary concern was that in the months following the concessions, the airline industry began to rebound, and so did Northwest. In 1994, 1995 and 1996 the company posted record earnings.

In late 1996, union contracts with the concessions expired. For almost two years the unions had been working without contracts, the pilots' pay proposal had been on the table from the beginning, and management negotiators had not been willing to talk to the issue. The talks had therefore been confined to non-economic issues and Northwest consistently refused to discuss negotiations in public. Most importantly, Northwest was the first of the "Big Four" airlines (American, Delta, and United) to reach the end of their concession contract and to enter negotiations while the company was experiencing record profits. In July 1996, management negotiators finally ran out of non-economic issues to talk about and bargaining at last turned to the issue of compensation. For 22 months, Northwest was willing to talk, as long as pay was not the subject. Yet, as soon as the issue of compensation came up, they were only willing to talk for three days before giving up in frustration (Zoller, 1998).

Recently, the pilots= contract had called for a three-percent wage snap-up following the 39 months of concessions. Northwest denied the raise, quibbling over the meaning of a single word in the agreement. To resolve the definition of that word "increase" required a 9-month arbitration procedure that delayed the snap-up. The pilots eventually prevailed, but for 9 months Northwest essentially received an interest-free loan from its employees.

Management proposed a wage formula based on average salaries at United, American and Delta, (instead of going to arbitration every year). However, the pilots objected, they believed that management was trying to avoid paying them a fair amount. Management's proposal was not fair because United pilots took a pay cut to purchase the airline, and at Delta, pilots= wages were reduced and frozen in an agreement negotiated during hard economic times. Tying Northwest pay to these reduced and frozen salaries would stagnate Northwest pilots' pay rates. Additionally, pilot compensation at all three of these airlines included stock and profit sharing, which Northwest had deliberately left out of their proposed formula (Zoller, 1998).

The National Mediation Board (NMB) attempted to facilitate negotiations from June 10 through June 12. The AirLine Pilots Association (ALPA) was pressured to recover money conceded under concessions and was insisting on retroactive pay for two years past the amendable date. The Air Line Pilots Association submitted a new pay proposal which was subsequently rejected by management. In late July, the National Mediation Board declared an impasse in the negotiations between the representatives of the pilots and management at Northwest. At this time, they offered both sides the opportunity to settle their dispute through binding arbitration. While Management appeared willing to comply, the pilots were not. The 30-day "cooling-off" period began at this time and negotiations continued. This "cooling-off" period ended at midnight on 28 August 1998 and the Master Executive Council (MEC) of Northwest=s AirLine Pilots Association vote to strike was unanimous.

The major contentions that separated Northwest Airlines management and ALPA were job security, pay, retirement, B-Scales, retroactive pay, per diem, and profit sharing (Zoller, 1998). Generally speaking, ALPA wanted pay and benefits that reflected the big three airline's pilots' pay and benefits packages.

ALPA wanted assurances that when a plane was retired, passenger traffic would not be diverted to a regional jet (RJ) flown by a non-Northwest ALPA pilot. While Northwest wanted authority to operate an unlimited number of regional jets, ALPA sought to limit the airline to 66 RJs with the option to add an additional 30 aircraft under certain constraints (Zoller, 1998).

ALPA sought a 15 percent raise over five years and up to five percent of their earnings as profit sharing. Northwest proposed two counter offers. First, they proposed to raise wages 10 percent over five years. Second Northwest offered to adjust the pilots' salaries in equal measure to the average pilot salary of the three largest airlines. During the negotiations, both ALPA and Northwest were relying on their competitor airlines' wages to gain advantage; Northwest wanted to tie pilot's wages to the big three, United, Delta, and American. Northwest pointed out that under their proposal Northwest pilots would make more money than the average of the big three, 4.5% more. ALPA countered that both United and Delta pilots were working under long term Aconcessionary@ contracts negotiated when those airlines were losing money. ALPA also reasoned that United and Delta would most likely renegotiate those contracts now that those companies were making profits and their pilots' contracts become amendable in 2000. ALPA also pointed out that American Airline pilots were currently making more money than their counterparts at Northwest. ALPA's overall strategy aimed at pushing Northwest pilots wages 0.9 percent higher than American pilots in 1998, whose contracts weren't concessionary, and 3.8 percent higher by 2000 (Northwest MEC, 1998).

Northwest wanted retirement benefits to be tied to the pilot's salary over the last five years of employment. ALPA wanted the calculation to be based on the pilot's best-paid 36 months within their last 60 months of employment.

Northwest also proposed a form of death benefit survivorship annuity called the Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity. Under the plan, the pilot's spouse could receive a 50 percent annuity if they would accept a cut to 96.4 percent of their retirement. ALPA opposed this deduction to 96.4 percent and wanted annuity without stipulation. After all, they contended that this benefit was an industry standard.

The B-Scale, or two tier pay scale, could be seen as the result of frustrated negotiations and shortsighted management and union representatives (Litan, 1998). At Northwest, the B-Scale is based on a percentage of the Captain's pay and currently was the longest and most onerous B-Scale in the industry. Northwest proposed to phase out the B-Scale pay rates over three years for pilots in employment years four and five. B-Scale would remain in effect for pilots in years two and three of employment. ALPA proposed to eliminate B-Scale pay rates all together, pointing out that this was the standard with American, Continental, and US Airways.

Northwest proposed that the pilots be given a lump sum 3.5 percent raise for income earned from November 31, 1996, which was the expiration date of the last contract, to the date of the new contract. ALPA proposed a 5.5 percent payment, and that this be made through stock options, something Northwest management vehemently opposed.

Northwest proposed to increase hourly per diem by $0.05 at the date of signing. ALPA requested a $0.10 at the date of the new agreement with an additional $0.10 two years later.

ALPA rejected Northwest's profit sharing plan because the company set its financial target too high before shares were distributed. Their targets were so high that under this plan, Northwest would have paid out shares only twice during its history. ALPA also claimed that the distributions when paid out would not be enough; 1.5 percent to 2.5 percent of annual salaries is all the pilots would receive. Northwest contended that the plan would add as much as 5 percent to pilot paychecks. ALPA's proposal would boost the maximum sharing to 6 percent of annual salaries, and mirror Delta and American's profit sharing targets.

During the strike, both ALPA and Northwest maintained websites, held news conferences, and actively worked to gain public support for their point of view. While the ALPA pilots picketed at airports, the airline management aired several television advertisements. In addition, management laid off an additional 27,500 employees, hoping to weaken ALPA's bargaining position. The focus of this publicity was to blame the union for the strike and the inconvenience it caused travelers and negative economic impact it had on some communities. Both sides wanted to gain public support to influence possible government intervention recalling that President Clinton had stopped the American Airlines strike of 1997. The inability to strike significantly weakened the union's position. ALPA wanted to prevent government intervention, while Northwest encouraged the President to force the pilots back to work.

Government Intervention

The National Mediation Board appointed a federal mediator in July, 1998 and talks continued under the direction of this Federal Mediator for 15 days. The Board decided that further mediation would not be successful without an impasse declaration. Governor Ed Schaefer requested that President Clinton invoke the Taft-Hartley Act to keep the airline running. On the 11^th day of the strike, the mediators met independently with both sides in hopes of persuading them to return to the bargaining table. The next day, President Clinton sent deputy White House counsel Bruce Lindsey and Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater to meet with the federal mediator who had been working with the pilots and the airlines.

Under section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, the President is authorized to create a Presidential Emergency Board (PEB) to investigate and report on a dispute between labor and management if it has not been resolved through the National Mediation Board. However, he can do this only when there is a substantial economic threat that would deprive a region of a major transportation service. The president gave no indication that he was going to give such an order. Showing a little muscle, Lindsey warned Northwest management that if the airline did not soften its stand on the pilots' demands, the White House would rethink its approval of Northwest's pending alliance with Continental Airlines. He also threatened to force Northwest to resume operations at its affiliated commuter airlines, which serve dozens of smaller cities. Lindsey then told the pilots that if they did not negotiate, President Clinton would declare a public emergency and force them back to work, as he did last year with striking pilots from American airlines.

When American Air pilots went on strike in February 1997, President Clinton invoked the 1926 Railway Labor Relations Act to halt it only minutes after it began. Clinton has invoked the Railway Labor Relations Act 12 times since taking office, 11 times in railroad disputes and once in the case of American Airlines. That precedent led some experts to believe that Clinton would use the act again to avert a pilots strike at Northwest. However, other experts thought intervening in another airline strike would be politically dangerous for Clinton as it would anger unions when Democrats needed labor support for the fall's Congressional elections.

Contract Settlement

On September 8, contract talks resumed. On September 12, 1998, the Master Executive Council (MEC) of the Airlines Pilots Association, the elected representatives of Northwest Airlines 6,200 pilots voted to ratify a new 4-year contract. Their agreement provided pilots with a return on their 1993 investment to "save the company while allowing Northwest to continue to grow and remain competitive in the marketplace" (Zoller, 1998).

Major elements of Northwest Pilots' Contract agreement

The Agreement approved the Continental Code Share Alliance, including significant job protections for Northwest pilots, the extension of the current Northwest Board of Directors seat, furlough protection for all current Northwest pilots, and a regional jet agreement that linked regional jet growth to net Northwest narrow-body fleet growth.

Book rate increased 3 percent on date of signing, plus three annual 3 percent raises for the succeeding three 12 percent over four years. A grant of one million in stock options was authorized at the date of signing, and an additional $500,000 in stock options were to be allocated each subsequent year, 2.5 million in stock options over four years. All options were to have a 10-year duration from the grant date. A lump sum retroactive payment of 3.5 percent of W-2 wages from the amendable date, October 31, 1996, to date of signing. The elimination of the B-scale over three years as follows: upon date of signing eliminate fifth year; date of signing plus one year, eliminate fourth year; date of signing plus two years, eliminate third year; date of signing plus three years, eliminate second year. Probationary pay rates were increased to $33 per hour upon the date of signing and all subsequent 3 percent contractual pay increases were to apply to probationary pilots as well. The profit sharing plan became effective when company profit margins are above 6 percent, but the Plan capped each eligible member=s share at 5 percent of W-2 earnings.

Trip hour credit changed from one for 3.45 to one for 3.50.

Increases in per diem rates were changed for the life of the contract to $1.85 per hour domestic, $2.05 per hour international travel.

The vacation bidding system was revised that eliminated vacation cancellation and increased the value of a vacation day to 3:05 hours per day in 1999 and 3:30 hours in the year 2000. Included as part of this new vacation bidding system was a mandatory redemption of 1998 arrears vacations 3:30 hours per day rate to facilitate the transition to the new system.

An increase in the instructor override $600 per month.

A variable cap system of 75 to 81 hours per month and the continuation of voluntary high time flying were adopted.

The elimination of dual qualification to take effect immediately, a new permanent position awarding system was established, and an exception to the two-year freeze for initial captain upgrades was adopted.

New SILO/FIFO reserve assignment system established.

No new monthly health insurance premiums, but increased health insurance coverage was established, a new prescription drug card program was initiated, and the lifetime maximum benefit cap was eliminated. Increased orthodontia benefits, and company paid healthcare coverage at 15 years of service for normal retirements were established.

A four-year agreement was set into place upon date of signing.

One hundred percent Qualified Joint and Survivor benefit was initiated for all retirees from the amendable date forward.

With several other airlines commencing contract negotiations, the implications for negotiators for both sides are clear. Unions expect paybacks for the early 1990 concessionary contract in view of a strong economy and record airline earnings. Both sides have spent huge amounts of money communicating their positions to the public. Access to the World Wide Web, email, paid network spots, and newspaper advertisements allowed a wide broadcast of each organization's collective bargaining offer. Airlines cannot expect to have record profits, increase management salaries, and still communicate a view of employee compensation control in order to prepare for a possible future financial crisis. Increased costs shall surely be passed on to the consumer and one final issue not completely addressed by the Northwest negotiations is the new trend of airline globalization via code share agreements and alliances. Multi-managed airlines will certainly seek to transfer jobs to those airlines whose salaries are the lowest, reducing overall labor costs. Unions will need to assess this impact on jobs and salaries, and develop a method to avoid a competitive struggle between competing airline unions to retain their jobs within their own company at the sacrifice of workers at other airlines.

Conclusion

The pilots= strike may have been costly to Northwest airlines, however, it seems to have accomplished what the pilots had set out to do, and notably the pilots' association negotiators received more than the original offer made by management. It may seem the airline is out of danger with the pilots. The Northwest employees who were laid off during the strike are back to work, however, Northwest=s management is not breathing easy just yet. The pilots= strike was settled, and the pilots claimed that they received the majority of what they fought for, and management claimed victory for keeping the unions from receiving too much. This settlement is only one of six that needs to be finalized. There are five more unions including the International Association of Machinists (IAM) Local 1833 that could initiate a strike action if talks are not successful. The 27,000 members of IAM 1833 Union authorized a strike and asked federal mediators to declare an impasse. Northwest could be in for a series of strikes if nothing is accomplished in the negotiations within the 30-day "cooling-off@ period.

In a perfect world, managers see their employees as necessary and important elements in the effectiveness and prosperity of the company. The airline industry may suffer the same fate as stock holders when stock holders began to realize that managers who grew up with the company, were more likely to sympathize with workers and less likely to push for profits. Present day hiring of corporate Awhiz-kids" who are typically well paid, possess a Masters in Business Administration (MBA), with one objective (Northwest MEC, 1998), increase profits, maximize dividends, and give up as little as possible to the workforce. With this style of leadership, management has succeeded in becoming completely separated from work force problems, and may concern itself primarily with how well it satisfies the desires of stockholders. Trust weakens when workers realize the separation distance between management priorities and worker issues.

With unions in place, management may be placed in a position of forced negotiation. This could create an attitude that one side must win over the other in order to reap more of the company profits. If management succeeds in keeping wage increases and benefits low, when profits and dividends are higher, then stockholders get rich, and management receives bonuses. The workforce, under the watchful eye of the unions, remains well aware of company profitability, performance, and capability regarding pay increases. When profits are up, workers expect pay and benefit increases. When pay and other forms of compensation are primary issues, management must be prepared to convince the unions that the profits do not really exist in order to keep profits on their side. As complicated as this scenario appears to be, it explains why collective bargaining in the airline industry is extremely difficult. Managers and workers see the other side as the enemy. It is sad, but clearly, this dilemma exists as a separation of specific goals. As long as management focuses on its own performance goals, and ignores work force goals and problems, both sides will continue to debate.

The unions must also be careful of corporate managers who have become experts in holding all the cards. If pushed, they are likely to retaliate by selling off company assets and locking the doors, just as Frank Lorenzo did with Eastern Airlines.

As of November 21, 1998, Northwest had tentative or final agreements with three of its six U.S. labor unions. In addition to ALPA, the airline has agreements with the Aircraft Technical Support Association (ATSA) and the Northwest Airlines Meteorologists Association (NAMA). (Labor, 1998).

After nearly two years of negotiations, it took a strike and government pressure to garner an agreement between Northwest and its pilots. The pilots wanted payback for their concessions, and got it. Now, other unions at Northwest and other carriers are eyeing the prize won by the pilots. As Vince Bazzachini, president of the IAM local 1833 stated, "They (the pilots) did better than the original offer and that indicates that we can do better too" (Silver, 1998).

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Available: http://www.nwaalpa.org/ [September 12, 1998]

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