Criminal Justice as a discipline is dependent on social and behavioral science data and methodology. However, the discipline differs fro other social science disciplines in several significant ways: (1) Undergraduate criminal justice students often proceed directly into unsupervised practice iwth wide discretion. (2) The discipline has a law/justice dimension not easily translatable into social science methodology. (3) The breadth of subject matter in the discipline involves substantial theoretical and practitioner conflict. This combination of circumstances, and others, contribute to some unique and substantial teaching issues for criminal justice educators. Several approaces to meeting these challenges are described. (1) Involving students in a critical analysis of social and behavioral science theory utilizing a paradigmatic thought perspective. (2) Utilizing the same process to present and relate justice theory to social science theory. (3) Using a variety of teaching techniques specifically designed to enhance critical thinking and interdisciplinary overview. The overall result sought is enhancing a practitioner/ philosopher perspective in the students. This perspective may assist them in understanding the limits of social science data and methodology in doing applied justice while helping them to resolve ambiguities and conflicts that are an inherent part of criminal justice study.

Different issues, problems, and perhaps even rewards, often evolve in meaningful ways in interdisciplinary programs. Some programs may not be fully rooted in the social and behavioral sciences, yet, are dependent on them. Criminal justice, a discipline with a relatively short history is such a program. Arguably, though, its ostensive subject matter, the defining, processing, and treatment of deviance predates written history. But, if deviance were its only subject matter, the issues and problems would not be so complex. Indeed, if deviance was the only subject matter, there would be no need for the discipline of criminal justice. Sociology and psychology could, and have, dealt extensively with issues of deviance.

Criminal justice as a discipline adds several other concerns. Not the least of these involves the second part of the disciplinary title--"justice." Justice is an ambiguous, but fundamental, concept to the discipline. Too often, justice concepts come into direct conflict with social science, and particularly, behavioral science, "knowledge." Further, the study and practice of criminal justice involves a concentration on a system composed of law enforcement, courts, corrections, and what many call a separate system, juvenile justice. Understanding this "system" and analyzing its practices involves considering the affects of external and internal influences like politics, economics, and organizational behavior. Thus, criminal justice as a discipline involves the study of often methodologically dissimilar fields such as philosophy, law, and the social sciences. This begs the question, how do you teach all this?

This discussion concentrates on teaching concerns central to integrating social and behavioral sciences with applied justice. While it is tempting to go further, this writing more specifically concentrates on these issues and problems in the context of teaching in a "free standing" undergraduate Department of Criminal Justice. This undergraduate focus is important to understanding the issues. On a national basis, quite often the undergraduate criminal justice curriculum is designated as a program within a larger department, such as, sociology, public administration, or political science. Within those programs, the disciplinary bias of the major program too often shows through.

For example, an examination of position ads for criminal justice faculty in an enclosed program often display a preference for an individual trained first in the major discipline, sociology, political science, etc, and secondarily in "criminal justice." The implications of this are clear. The criminal justice student in these encapsulated programs will be inculcated with the social science model, values, and methodology of the dominant group. This is not necessarily a negative thing as far as the study of criminal justice is concerned.. Arguably, this approach may offer somewhat clearer theoretical parameters. "Somewhat clearer" is the operational term since, of course, as Kuhn (1970) relates, intradisciplinary theoretical conflict can be substantial.

Criminal justice departments, in contrast, tend toward having faculty trained in several different disciplines. At best, this can create innovative departments with strong collegial faculties. At worst, it can create a "Tower of Babel" in which one voice defeats the purpose of the other. Smith (1996) for example, notes that there can be substantial teaching conflicts between the law/justice and normative behavioral aspects of criminal justice. Smith's observations point out a key area for teaching analysis. Precisely because so much of criminal justice education is conducted by faculty trained as qualitative or quantitative social scientists, there is much more emphasis placed on the criminal part of the discipline and very little on the justice part. This is particularly evident in programs within criminology departments.

There are many reasons for these conflicts, some normative and some just personal/ political. But these can be put into four major categories:

1. Criminal Justice programs have become "cash cows," both as programs in larger departments and as stand alone departments. The huge number of students enrolled in Criminal Justice programs and departments subsidizes either the major program in the larger college. There is no practical reason to put more resources into things that grow without them.

2. Only within the last decade has criminal justice really developed its own doctoral programs. Traditionally, faculty were trained first in another discipline. At this point still, few hiring departments require the Ph.D. to be in criminal justice, only that it be in a "related discipline."

3. A majority of institutions offering undergraduate criminal justice programs only offer graduate programs within a cover discipline. And the majority of stand alone Criminal Justice Departments do not offer graduate programs. Hence, they must "refer" students to other disciplines for graduate work when students want to remain at the same school.

4. The sheer complexity of the study and teaching of criminal justice creates "turf wars" and intradisciplinary, let alone, interdisciplinary conflicts.

All of this again begs the question. The study and, most importantly, the teaching of criminal justice to undergraduates, requires a transfer of a sound knowledge of social and behavioral sciences and a clear conceptualization of the philosophy of justice. This transfer must be far beyond that which undergraduates are normally exposed to in "Core" curriculums. While the goal of such core requirements, for example, introductory courses in social sciences, humanities, and senior level critical thinking/writing courses, is laudable, it does not go far enough for criminal justice students. Core courses are intended to provide a common liberal arts exposure for all students, regardless of major. The criminal justice curriculum must go further because of the intimate involvement of the discipline with "applied justice."

Unlike workers in most other disciplines, the recent criminal justice graduate, let alone the in-service ones and those with no college level education at all, often exercise enormous discretion under minimal and even no supervision. Indeed, criminal justice practitioners have an almost exclusive power to do things, like hold people captive or seize their property, that if done by private citizens would be crimes. Further, as in most disciplines, the majority of students will not go on to graduate work soon, if ever. Thus, students must be equipped with substantial critical thinking skills early on in their formal education and those skills must be finally honed by the time of their entry into the workplace. At the minimum, they must internalize a perspective of rejecting easy answers to complex questions--and actively working to expose the "mythology" of criminal justice.

Critical analysis of the social and behavioral sciences is especially important for the exposure of criminal justice mythology. It is poor or inappropriate science that underpins too many poor and/or inappropriate criminal justice policy and practices. This generates unique teaching conflicts that require: (a) defining the limits of theory in a critical manner and, (b) balancing teaching and curriculum along "practitioner/philosopher" lines.

A Condensed Course in Critiquing Social Science and Justice Theory⁽¹⁾

From the very beginning of their education it must be made clear to students that justice is an overworked word. Everyone wants it as if it was a market commodity. Very few would ever claim they want to do injustice. But, many of the most horrifying actions of individuals, groups, and nations, have been done in the name of justice. Think, for example, of how many times you have heard someone say "justice demands this." And then consider, did justice demand the thing or end desired, or, did the person use the term justice to rationalize the demand for some goal they desired? A large part of the problem is that, as the saying goes, "like beauty, it is in the eyes of the beholder." Nevertheless, for millennia scholars and poets have tried to define it, kings and revolutionaries have tried to do it, and more recently, scientists of several sorts have tried to measure and predict it. "Justice Studies" has grown to be a program in many schools, sometimes as a new name for criminal justice, and in others as a new discipline. Doctoral programs in Justice Studies, like that at Arizona State in Tempe now exist, although, such programs are still not common.

Clearly, there is so much literature and theory about justice that it is impractical to cover more than a small part of it in an undergraduate criminal justice program. What can be done is to concentrate on common themes and common conceptual roots of justice. Within this line of thought it can be seen that virtually all, if not all, ideas about justice fall into three major models, paradigms, if you will. These models, Absolute, Equity, and Due Process, can be seen operating at the interpersonal, cultural and societal level. They reflect assumptions about human nature, the human condition, and the qualities and quantity of justice. More importantly, they are "visible" as "behavior" in the form of social custom, law, government, and in the actual policy and practice which translates abstractions into conduct. When students are presented with justice as applied theory as in Table 1 conflicts between what they have experienced, what they have been told, and what they want to believe become more understandable.

Table 1: Models of Justice

Absolute Models	Equity Models	Due Process Models
Good and Evil	Distributive (Sager, 1980)	Democratic definition (White, 1990)
Eye for and eye (Jacoby, 1983)	Fairness (Rawls, 1971)	Market forces (Unger, 1986)
Transcendent authority	Protecting the weak	Adversarial legal (Friedman, 1985)
Darwinism	Equal access (Kahlenberg, 1996)	Inquisitorial legal

A key to understanding these models, and to teaching them, is appreciating that without exception, every concept of justice is based upon a core unprovable assumption.⁽²⁾ While the models are Weberian ideal types, they do have common roots in the assumptions that legitimate them. These assumptions may seem to range widely, but on closer examination the fundamental assumption shows through.

Absolute models may range from a religious base of a god, or an "immutable truth" scientific or otherwise, as in Darwinistic models, directing the means and ends of justice. They are "absolute" because their source of legitimacy is cited as virtually unquestionable. Thus, "god demands this," or, "it is clear that those people are there because they are biologically incapable of competing." At one level, absolute models can be seen operating in say a theocracy, where everyone is subject to the same rules and punishments. The rules apply to everyone without exception, even those just passing through. Often, because there is no question that a rule has been violated, and no room for individual considerations, justice is summary. At another level, absolute models can justify treating people differently because of some inherent trait. (this is different than equity) which is seen to justify the treatment, regardless of circumstances.

Equity models are more individually directed. Personalized adjustments that consider individual or unique circumstances are utilized to bring about personalized results. In equity models concepts of fairness, realizing that for example, the same punishment for the same crime is not always appropriate, drive the search for a just result. Equity models often concern themselves with disparate power and ability and with compensating for this disparity. One common aspect of equity models is their reliance on specially trained people to analyze and evaluate circumstances and "apply justice."

Due process models often develop with a rejection of absolutes as too harsh and equity as unworkable because there is no one wise enough to do it, or, with a feeling that too much power in centralized in one person. In contrast to equity, due process does not concentrate so much on the result but on the legitimacy of the process. Thus, the result may seem unfair, but if the process was fair then it is a legitimate process and the result is legitimate. Due process models also tend to encourage open participation by many and assume that all parties are acting rationally. In this sense, justice is defined as the result of what the majority decides. Little, other than rhetorical, attention is paid to referencing morality.

Due process and equity models are more social science driven then absolute models. That is, they depend upon assumptions, often "tested," about individual and/or collective human behavior. Ergo, the democratic political process assumes a certain rationality in human decision making as does micro and macro economic theory. Legal models follow these same assumptions by directing a process that presumedly discloses "the" truth about a particular interaction and then legitimizes the remedy, punishment, monetary damages, and injunctive relief, by the process. In the same vein, equity often looks at whether an individual had the ability to understand their actions or has special needs. Classic nurture theory might be used to explain behavior and to fashion a remedy.

An example that is helpful for students in understanding the differences between the models is that of a youth who steals food. In an absolute model, s/he is a thief, and the punishment for a thief is prison (or losing a hand). No question, do the punishment. In an equity model questions would be asked as to "why" s/he stole. It may be that hunger would relieve the youth of any criminal liability. The youth might even be given food and shelter to help them. Conversely, it could be found that the theft was uncalled for and repetitive and therefore punishment is called for. In a due process model, a trial would be held, the evidence given, and the jury would reach a verdict. If the law allowed for leniency, it could be given, if it did not, it would not.

A key for understanding these models is to look at how the formal and informal systems operate in practice, and the wide divergence geographically. For instance, from state to state there is wide variance in how juveniles are handled. In some states juveniles are automatically handled by the juvenile system, which tends to be equity based, no matter how severe the crime. In others, juveniles who commit certain crimes, no matter how young, are automatically transferred to the adult system. Some jurisdictions allow great flexibility in sentencing. In others, the sentence is mandatory, and often harsh. In some jurisdictions, for whatever reasons, prosecutors will not prosecute certain cases, or persons because they deem the potential penalties as too harsh. In others, they almost always seek the harshest penalties. All of these systems are legal, all of them are deemed "just." In many instances, social science data is used to justify a movement in either direction. For example, theory which tends to say people make rational choices to commit crimes, or that people cannot be rehabilitated, is used to justify harsher penalties for ever younger people.

Using these admittedly simplistic models and examples, the student can begin to see that social science is intimately involved with justifying, or disproving, the validity of justice models. They also begin to learn that this is not a new idea. The legal realists, for example, have long argued (1930s) that judges are more social engineers than appliers of the law ( Fisher, Horwitz and Reed, 1993). In the same tradition, the Critical Legal Studies movement is a combination of conflict/power social theory applied to justice decision making (Unger, 1986). Lempert and Sanders (1986) describe many of the interactions among law and social science using applied choice theory and decision modeling. Not surprisingly, the major area of focus for social science study of justice has been law and its actors. Law, in social science terms, is easy to quantify. It is important to note, though, that the goal of social science is not to prove or disprove justice theory. The goal is to explain a particular behavior or set of behaviors.

It cannot be ignored, however, that such explanations often have political implications. For example, biological theories of behavior are often used to justify movement away from rehabilitative (equity) models of corrections to incapacitative or punishment (absolute) models. Another example would be the sociologists and psychologists (and social psychologists) who have been active in jury studies with an end goal of predicting how environmental influences shape jury decisions and hence predict the decision. However, if jury decisions are largely the product of influences other than the evidence, then a major component of the Due Process Model, the rationality of the jury, is undermined. Indeed, if juries are swayed not by evidence and logic, then arguably juries are unjust and a different mechanism for resolving disputes should be examined.

There is a problem, though, with looking at juries through social science eyes. Juries may seem to be acting irrationally or illogically because they perceive the law or the situation as unjust. It may be that juries operate best when they ignore both the law and logic and bring in a verdict consistent with their conscience. This is a stance taken by those who argue for an official revival of jury nullification. The point is, social scientists are severely constrained when they study things that may operate at several different levels and when the system within which the dependent variable operates is not fully understood itself.

To look at these interactions of social science and justice further it is helpful to expose the student to a closer examination of social science assumptions about behavior and how those assumptions intertwine with justice concepts.

While the democratic choice model predates modern social science, it does not predate assumptions about the rational nature of man. Indeed, it is intimately intertwined with such assumptions. It developed incrementally over centuries into Western ideological dominance with the Age of Enlightenment and its rejection of deity based legitimacy for government and law. Ironically, to legitimate the democratic choice model, it was often necessary to rein in the excesses of absolute power inherent in positive law with references to"transcendent authority" which limited government interference with "inalienable rights." Ironically, but not surprisingly, in the eyes of a legal behaviorist like Black (1976), a reference to transcendent authority produces an often more repressive absolute justice system. Anyone can state what that transcendent authority requires, and they are not even constrained by a god.

When external and internal phenomena and expectations of behavior were explained and justified by one model, one paradigm, conflict was minimal. As knowledge began to fragment, into science and philosophy and both became applied justice in the form of law, conflict increased. From this beginning, there have been conflicts between science, justice, and law. Science itself called into question many of the assumptions that legitimized particular perspectives of the social order, and hence, justice. As Goethe wrote about the Copernican Revolution:

Perhaps a greater demand has never been laid upon mankind; for by this admission (that the earth is not the center of the universe), how much else did not collapse in dust and smoke: a second paradise, a world of innocense, poetry, and piety, the witness of the senses, the convictions of a poetic and religious faith, no wonder that men had no stomach for all this, that they ranged themselves in every way against such doctrine (cited by Zukav, 1979, 210-211).

Zukav (1979) in his work on the "New Physics" relates that a fundamental question of quantum mechanics is that of the affect of the observer on the observed. Carried on, it can be seen that if the hard sciences can have profound effect on the social fabric, then clearly, the social sciences which call into question the "nature of man and society" can have an equally profound effect on human behavior (Chaires and Stitt, 1994). Tribe (1989) describes one aspect of this in his observations about judges and the law. Many judges, particularly appellate judges, he notes, like to treat the law as something separate from the everyday world. Law to them is a series of rules logically developed which resolve a particular conflict. However, whatever law that develops from a particular decision may in fact ripple out and change the social order by creating and extinguishing different rights and duties between individuals and groups.

These issues are increased in complexity when social science data enters into the equation. Much of the American jurisprudence developed in pre-civil war times and concerned commerce, contracts and state sovereignty. As Mensch (1989) points out, a major role of the courts of the time was to decide what was not the province of government. Under this guise labor unions were unlawful interference with the right to contract, blacks were property, and women and children not much more. Post-civil war legislation brought the 13^th (1865 ) and 14^th (1868) Amendments as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Little was done with these, however, until the 1950s.

While there are many reasons for this, the bourgeoning social sciences played no little part in maintaining the status quo. Concepts like Social and Economic Darwinism gave legitimacy to a system that maintained class structure and a segregated society. Scientists and quasi-scientists were not reluctant to talk about genetic and physical inferiority as if they were immutable truth. The old Calvinist belief that those at the bottom were there because it was predetermined by God that they be so, was resurrected in the guise of a neutral science (Tawney 1926; Weber 1958). Berenbaum, (1993:31-34) in his study of the Holocaust notes that while Hitler was implementing racial purity and instituting programs for its study in every German university, America was involved in similar activities, sterilizing the feeble minded, the mentally ill, and certain kinds of criminals. The belief being that criminal and antisocial behavior was caused by genetic predisposition and/or physiology, or that "bad" genes were polluting the gene pool.

While very few today would publicly acclaim such eugenic racism, its paradigmatic roots, that human behavior is determined soley, or primarily, by the biological, remains as part of mainstream political and scientific thought. Clearly, when such views become the dominant view of the etiology of poverty, failure, and crime (Wilson & Herrnstein 1985; Herrnstein & Murray 1994) there are substantial, and severe, implications in the formation of justice policy and practice.

Other than hard science students, undergraduates tend to be either in awe of science or indifferent. They do not tend to be critical, to know or appreciate the difference between good science and bad science. Within the research community the terms bad science and good science have a different meaning than in society at large. To much of society, bad science is equated with creations like Frankenstein or doomsday weapons gone amuck. Within the research community good science and bad science primarily refer to methodology and quality, not product. However, even the most neophyte scientist is aware that there are political aspects to the conduct of science. Those political aspects can range from resistance to "new science" as in the paradigmatic shifts described in Kuhn's (1970) classic work, to the politics of the grant process. Within this line of thought, clearly, the "softer" the science, the more paradigmatic problems in the Kuhnian sense, and the more the politics of research are compounded.

In substantial part, the "consumers" of science contribute to the issues of bad science and good science. Quite often, the criticism of hard science revolves around its origin in or cooption by, the defense industry. Indeed, were it not for this almost cliche, a lot of fiction could not be written or movies made. Who consumes social science, and particularly behavioral science, makes for quite a different issue. Government, business and the military consume a lot of social science in the form of applied research. Opinions (as in voting), desires (as in marketing), and selection (as in employees) are the bread and butter of social research.

A more difficult question for social science occurs when a particular theory is utilized in the formation of programmatic responses to a particular social ill. Organizing the issues and problems of how real or perceived crisis generates theory and theory generates law, policy, and programs, helps students understand the interrelationships. When the additional dimension of how bureaucracies interpret and apply their charges, (law, policy and programs) is added to the equation, students begin to get a perspective on how dynamic the interactions are. This can be done in the form of looking at mythology, theory conflict, and organizations.

The examination of mythology begins with the question, "is there is a real issue or problem to begin with?" A substantial part of criminal justice literature is concerned with refuting the "Myths and Legends" of criminal justice, a term coined by Atkins and Pogrebin (1978) twenty years ago. Kappeler, Blumberg and Potter (1996) for example, relate how the mythology of criminal justice is created and generated with a complex weave of misconstrued, or false, social science data, media hype, and political manipulation. At some point these things become so "real" that no one questions them anymore and myth gets built on myth. The "War on Crime and Drugs" is an example of this. It has reached such proportions that for politicians, to advocate less draconian enforcement and punishment is political suicide.

The problem occurs when rhetoric turns into policy and practice. As is often pointed out in what is called the Thomas Theorem "Situations perceived as real are real in their consequences" (Henshel and Silverman 1975, p.11 ). If the policy and practice of the criminal justice system acts like there is a crime crisis it may make no difference if there is one or not. Gordon (1990) for example, describes how the ideologically driven war on crime and drugs, supported in substantial part by suspect behavioral science theory, has resulted in the creation of a "justice juggernaut" with a capture, confine and observe policy that is self perpetuating. Perhaps more importantly, Gordon describes how the crime war has interacted with "welfare" policy to demonize urban minority males, and by implication all the inner city poor. Draconian crime control policy is justified, along with withdrawal of poverty supports because the recipients are undeserving-----and cannot benefit, a stance again supported by some social and behavioral science theory (Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985).

Even if the policies of the criminal justice system are well intentioned and premised on an appropriate paradigmatic model, the practice may bear little resemblance to the intent. This can be tied to three basic reasons:

1. Organizational behavior is such that the members of an organization may have significantly different goals, values, and preferred methods of operation than the organization. Justice, for better or worse, is largely a bureaucratic endeavor.

2. Budget concerns as much as, if not more than, any other factor, drive programmatic responses in government agencies. In the same way that solicited grant activity may suggest, or even demand the desired "finding," many funding sources for criminal justice agencies require statistical "proof" that funding is needed and that proof may be inconsistent with reality.

3. On a national basis, the kinds of skills and talents needed to analyze, plan, and implement justice related programs are in short supply in criminal justice, indeed in the public sector in general. Those well qualified individuals that do exist are unevenly distributed, geographically and programmatically throughout the system.

Chaires (1995) notes how these concerns may combine to produce unintended consequences. For example, he relates that Tort Reform was pushed in the 1980s and 1990s as the answer to all the frivolous claims that were clogging the courts and making American businesses uncompetitive. Many major reforms were made at the federal and state levels with the result that it became much more difficult to litigate against business interests. However, the area of law that most suffered from such reforms was not torts, but civil rights. Since civil rights claims are litigated under the same civil rules of procedure as are, say, a defective product case, many civil rights claims by their nature, contesting the status quo, were more subject to the restrictions of tort reform.

While it is very doubtful that the court clogging crisis of frivolous claims ever existed, social scientists on both sides of the issue were quick to produce statistical support for their cause. That there was strong contrary evidence against tort reform was largely ignored and the reform was legislated and implemented. This is the crux of structural and organizational use of social science data. Proponents of a political cause will ignore evidence to the contrary. In most areas where systemic change and actions are concerned and social science data is used, there is always a contrary force and contravening data. It does not matter how good or bad the methodology and/or data set is or is not, political acceptance is more important than scientific truth. This is not surprising given that the social sciences have always provided a wealth of conflicting theory and methodology.

The third of these conflicts is that of theory and data interpretation. It is the nature of the beast that each discipline examines issues and problems within the context of the major focus of the discipline. Sociologists look toward groups and explain pathology with theory on group behavior. Political scientists examine relationships, ideology and power. Psychologists look at individuals and the etiology of their behavior. While these are admittedly extremely simplistic descriptive statements, especially in the face of interdisciplinary study and disciplines like Social Psychology, these statements do have operative value.

Discipline not only defines the methodology of analysis, quite often discipline defines the programmatic "solution." Hence, a psychologist or sociologist might develop a therapy program to "cure" drug offenders, but to do so they would usually start with an assumption that there is some pathology with which to begin. It is unlikely that such therapy would start with the statement: "You are in this program because you used a harmless drug and are unlucky enough to live in a political jurisdiction which harshly penalizes such use." At the same time, there are individuals in the same discipline who are for all intents and purposes making that statement.

Similarities and Differences in Theory

Within the context of assumptions underpinning theory, social science disciplines are more alike then they are different. Ritzer (1975), for example, notes that sociology is a "multiple paradigm science." He describes three paradigms, Social Fact, Social Definition, and Social Behavior within which all sociology theory falls. Social fact theories treat external phenomena such as institutions and class as "real." These phenomena "determine " behavior in a process of the "whole being greater than the sum of the parts." Social definition theories are underpinned by the assumption that individuals define external reality by a process of consensus. There is no whole--only parts. Social behavior theories reject social fact and social definition theories as too abstract. Social behaviorists look for reproducible results, the "button to push." Why a particular behavior came into being is largely irrelevant.

Ritzer's observations seem to apply to most, if not all social science theory. The key to understanding this statement is to look at Ritzer's point about multiple paradigm disciplines. All of the established social science disciplines are multiple paradigm in that they all have multiple competing theories (unprovable assumptions) to explain the same behavior (Masterman, 1970). Each of these intradiscipline theories would tend to fall within Ritzer's social fact, social definition, and social behavior paradigms. It is important, though, to go beyond the label on a theory before classifying it. Behavioral psychology, for example, does not always belong in the social behavior paradigm. That school of behavioral psychology which holds that behavior is genetically predisposed or determined is in reality relying on a "social fact" paradigm.

Chaires and Stitt (1994,12) note that, "The assumption underlying theory has significant implications for the world view of teacher, student and practitioner. Which paradigm is applied has significant implications for policy and practice in criminal justice." They posit that there are three paradigms in criminal justice, Determinism, Free Will, and Result which are defined along the lines of Ritzer's (1975) multiple competing paradigm structure. In short, they note that how one answers two questions will often predict policy and practice. The questions are:

1. Is individual criminal behavior the result of determinate variables (i.e., environment, biology , class conflict, --all the old nature and nurture controversies--or is individual criminal behavior the result of conscious decision-making free will; and

2. Does it matter what causes criminality, or more pragmatically, is all that matters simply, what works (Chaires and Stitt 1994, p.12)?

Clearly, how you answer these questions goes a long way toward directing what kinds of programs you will develop and support. Further, how you answer these questions will often enclose the parameters of what you believe justice to be. That is, the more you tend toward a deterministic model for criminality, the more you will tend toward an Absolute model of justice. Conversely, the more you tend toward a free will model of behavior the more you will tend toward an Equity or Due Process model. More precisely, full free will models of behavior are more associated with Due Process assumptions and Equity models with "soft determinism" ala Matza, (1964). In the same line of thought, the more you tend toward a results paradigm, the more you will reject due process models. What can be observed here is that some paradigmatic assumptions may be incompatible with some models of justice. This can be shown as:

Table 2: Matching Justice and Theory

JUSTICE MODEL	Deterministic	Free Will	Results
Absolute	compatible	not compatible	compatible
Equity	not compatible	compatible	not compatible
Due Process	not compatible	compatible	not compatible

Again, this kind of modeling is simplistic and general. But, it gives students a tool for looking at issues and considering the impact of a particular theory. What begins to emerge here for the student, is that policy and practice decisions have larger ramifications then just the "problem solving." The issue for criminal justice teaching is how to convey these relationships. One way to do this is to emphasize the development of the practitioner/philosopher.

The Department of Criminal Justice at the University of Nevada, Reno has adopted in its Mission Statement a goal of producing the practitioner/philosopher. Generically, the expectation is that students be capable of viewing issues and problem from several perspectives, analyzing their own and others' motives and assumptions, and applying that knowledge to developing solutions that are realistic and compassionate. It is expected (hoped) that students will internalize a value of constantly examining social science and justice for conflicts. To understand these expectations it may be helpful to look at some perspectives on possible conflicts.

Glazer (1995) in his critique of Herrnstein and Murry's The Bell Curve hits one of the central issues in the conflict between science and justice when he notes:

Herrnstein and Murry could argue that whether they are biological or social, the differences among groups can lead to prejudice, discrimination, and various forms of brutality. Why accept the prevailing aversion to biological explanations? Well, there are very good reasons in recent history for this aversion, and while I would resist a ban on scientific work that tries to trace and estimate biological influences on intelligence, I would still prefer that social scientists press the social side of our explanation before resorting to biology. The latter suggests permanence and unchangeability.... (144).

Justice is not reducible to an equation. It not permanent and unchangeable. Nor is it always relative. Still, at the same time, justice is not purely the province of poets and philosophers. There is a measurable side to justice within several areas of interest to the social and behavioral sciences. What would be helpful to explore these is a common language of justice. White (1990) relates:

A proper language of reason......and a proper language of justice too, would accept the literary conditions on which we live; that while we struggle for coherence in our expression, this coherence will always be tentative, always incomplete, for all that we say, all that we are, is in part a function of the context in which we live (41).

Undergraduates by virtue of their usually tender years, often do not have the experience in life to have extensively observed the phenomena that they are exposed to in the form of theory. It may be that the most valuable transmission of knowledge that occurs in any context is the perspective that most explanations as to the cause(s) of a particular phenomena are in fact, just theory. It follows then that what can be done is to offer a variety of tools that can be used to analyze information and assist with the choice to apply----or not apply---- that information. This is the essence of the idea of the practitioner/philosopher, a person who must act or not act, who must make choices that will affect others. This is a person who also bases actions on a considered evaluation of both the validity of the information and a consideration of the impact of the decision on more then the immediate issue.

It is unrealistic, though, to expect undergraduates to have the methodological sophistication of a scientist, the critical thinking skills of a philosopher, and the contextual knowledge of a historian. What can be transferred to the student is a series of tools for evaluating justice issues in decisions and actions. One of these, the compatibility questions in Table 2 has already been shown. There are several others which can be effective teaching tools and also useful organizational tools for students.

One problem students, and others, have in evaluating theory is comparative perspective. It is not uncommon for students in theory courses to be presented with series of theories about the same observable phenomena without any guidance as to legitimacy. A classic example of this issue is that of racism in the criminal justice system. The debate as to whether the American criminal justice system is racist is long running and heated. As Young (1994,74) states, "the concept of disproportionality has become the mainstay of discussion on race and crime." Yet, there are some undisputed facts that give rise to the accusation. For instance, Mauer and Hauling (1995) note that one in three (32.2%) Black males between the ages of 18 and 28 is on probation, parole, or in prison. Proband (1995) relates that on June 30, 1995, 1,104.074 men and women were in state and federal prisons. Further, Black males were eight times as likely as White males to be in prison. Not surprisingly, where the dispute comes, is in why the numbers are so disparate.

The literature is volumous and often confusing and contradictory. Rather then just argue the various perspectives, it is helpful to students to have a frame of reference as to where arguments fall. Thus, an example of an extreme argument on one side would be that of Wilbanks (1987) who denies any racism in the system, arguing that the disparate numbers merely reflect the higher numbers of minorities that commit crimes. In far contrast, Mann (1993) argues that there is systematic, intentional racism pervading the entire criminal justice system. Both commentators use social science theory and statistical data, often the same, to buttress their perspectives. If a continuum on racism in the system were developed it would look like:

Table 3: Theory Continuum

No Racism

Unintentional Racism

Systemic, Intentional Racism

Wilbanks ------------------------------------------------------------------ Mann

With this kind of perspective, students can begin to view social science theory as not only containing paradigmatic assumptions, but also existing within ranges that have a relationship to justice concepts and the development of policy and practice. Of course, there are more extreme views than those of Wilbanks and Mann. But, the intent here is to stay within the mainstream and to display that even within the mainstream there is wide divergence.

By using a continuum students can then examine other perspectives and theory and place them along the continuum. In this process an understanding of the term "radical" develops. That is, most perspectives on racism will tend to cluster not at the ends but near the center of the continuum and will tend to involve more multivariant perspectives. If a particular perspective is beyond either end of the continuum, then perhaps it needs to be examined much more closely for legitimacy and justice impacts.

Another dimension of continuum use is argumentative. When theory diverges widely problems in reconciling them emerge. At one level this is what Kuhn's (1970) paradigm conflict is about. At the practitioner level, though, the issues grow more immediate. If there is a wide variance, how do you go about persuading others to change their perspective, or modify your own, or finally, in appropriate circumstances, stop the progression of another viewpoint. The "four corners" exercise is helpful in developing these skills.

It is axiomatic that undergraduate students do not like group projects. While the reasons are many, primary among them are the sharing of credit and the problems of working with diverse groups of people. The Four Corners technique was developed to minimize at least the second concern, working with diverse groups.

In the usual group project, students are assigned to a group randomly and given an assignment. This method is ineffective when dealing with highly value laden issues because a large amount of time and effort is expended on the group reaching some kind of consensus as to what the group direction should be. The Four Corners exercise avoids this preliminary small group dynamic issue by:

• Framing a precisely crafted issue or question.
• Offering four different stances or solutions to the issue or question.
• Letting the student chose which stance or solution they want to work with.

The directions to the students are fairly simple. Consider how you are going to sell your stance or position to at least one other group in order to form a majority and prevail (make your stance or solution the one that actually gets implemented.) For students to successfully complete the project they will generally have to:

• Understand the issue and problems of their own stance and how they differ, or do not differ, from the stances and solutions of the other groups.
• Consider what the political dynamics are of changing stances and solutions and target a specific group for the effort.
• Develop strategy and tactics to accomplish their goal.

The key to the exercise is framing the issue or question narrowly and then offering stances and solutions of which two are clearly different, relying on opposed paradigmatic assumptions, and two that are somewhat similar. Thus, a general question about the existence of racism in the criminal justice system would be too large an issue. But, a question about whether a specific practice was racist and should be changed would be appropriate. An example would be whether the 100 to 1 ratio for crack cocaine v. powder cocaine (possession of 5 grams of powder cocaine caries the same severe mandatory penalty as possession .5 grams of crack cocaine) in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is racist. This issue has generated substantial controversy because of its disparate impact on Blacks. While 60% of crack cocaine users are White, 98% of the convictions have been Black (Shein, 1993). The issues and solutions can be displayed as:

Table 4: Drug Disparity Exercise

1. The 100 to 1 ratio is legitimate because Congress can determine that one drug is much more dangerous to society than another. That enforcement results in the arrest and conviction of disproportionate numbers of Blacks does not indicate racial bias.	2. The 100 to 1 ratio is a legally legitimate exercise of Congressional authority, but, because it is so capable of abuse in enforcement and does target the poor and people of color it should be repealed.
3. The 100 to 1 ratio is a legitimate exercise of Congressional authority , but, more care should be taken to ensure that there is not bias in the enforcement of the law.	4. The 100 to 1 ratio is clearly a racist law intended to target Blacks for doing what rich White people can do with virtual impunity. The law should be declared unconstitutional as violating Equal Protection.

When doing exercises like this, students can begin to see how ideas are distributed across larger groups and what kind of justifications will be used to support or defeat a proposition. When an exercise like that in Table 3 is combined, the relationships between theory and the formulation of justice policy and practice become clearer. Finally, the students are exposed to the idea that it may be wasted effort to try to change belief structures that are diametrically opposed, because it is so difficult to overcome the unprovable assumption that underpins theory. Part of being a practitioner/philosopher is determining what is realistically doable and consistent with their own justice model.

In some instances, the appropriate method to examine the relationships among social science theory and justice is Socratic dialog. This method is particularly helpful as an adjunct to looking at theory continuums and the four corners method. While generations of law students have learned to hate the method, Socratic dialog offers a method to hone in on issues that need to be brought forth without "lecturing." Not lecturing is an important aspect of working with value laden issues like justice. The perspectives and analysis must largely come from the students themselves with the instructor only acting as a facilitator. Also, being careful to involve the entire class in the dialog as opposed to just one student reduces the terrorism factor. In this vein, using Table 3 and the Wilbanks/Mann continuum, a student might be asked about a current news piece from a source like Newsweekor Timeor even the local newspaper, that had some minority and criminal justice dimension. Seldom does a week pass without several relevant news items on virtually every major, or perceived to be major, criminal justice issue. Keeping the issues current is an important part of the process. When students see that the discussion relates to something happening today, not in the ancient history of 20 years ago, they tend to be more interested--and active. A dialog might look like this:

Instructor: In the paper this week there was an article about a proposed new law to require people on death row to file all legal claims in their first state level appeal or forfeit them (hand out article). It states that this will reduce the endless appeals and allow execution in a timely manner. Sounds like a good idea to me, justice delayed is justice denied, right?

Student 1: Sounds good to me!

Instructor: (addressing student) why is it good?

Student 1: Well, it's just deserts, if you kill someone the penalty should be that you die.

Instructor: Does that mean that everyone who kills someone should die?

Student 2: Of course not! Only people who commit first degree murder can be sentenced to death and then a jury must decide if the death penalty should apply.

Instructor: Who's choice is it to ask for the death penalty?

Student 2: It's the prosecutor's.

Student 3: Yea, and the prosecutor does what will get him in the paper and reelected.

Instructor: Wait! Your not saying that the decision to seek the death penalty--and its actual imposition, might have something to do with things other then the merits of the case and the evidence?

Student 4: I remember hearing in another class that the death penalty is only asked for when the defendant is unpopular or defenseless.

Instructor: What do you mean by unpopular and defenseless? ---- Who would you consider an unpopular defendant?----- Does defenseless mean they do not have an attorney, or, just that they do not have the resources to really fight the death penalty?------Then why are the poor----and especially Blacks, overwhelmingly on Death row?

The direction of this is clear. Each question leads to another question and gradually requests for support in the form of evidence are asked for. Whatever the support or evidence, it is requested that the student place it on the continuum. Gradually they learn that ideas cluster and that social and behavioral science ideas cluster in the same way--- around unprovable assumptions. Given that understanding, the study of criminal justice takes on a more personal dimension.

It is this gradual, incremental intertwining of social science theory and justice theory that can significantly contribute to the development of individuals that can leave an undergraduate criminal justice program questioning why they do things and how they do things. If students can leave any program understanding there is a great difference between what they can do--and what they should do---then the program has been successful.

The issues of approaching social science theory and analysis in criminal justice undergraduate programs are different then in most other disciplines. If they choose to go into criminal justice as a career, and many do not, they will primarily be "end users" of the social and behavioral sciences. They will constantly be exposed to "information overload" about the etiology of crime, the current new "razzle dazzle" program to "solve" the social ill of the year; all of this while being part of one of the most political, but least accountable, bureaucracies in America, the criminal justice system. Knowing this, a special duty is placed on faculty. Unlike many professional programs, there are no certification standards for criminal justice students, no required curriculum, no standards for faculty, no code of professional responsibility for practitioners. There is just an ambiguous body of knowledge, a multidisciplinary faculty, and a term--justice, in the description of the discipline.

Given this, there are some prescriptive directions criminal justice educators can go when examining the necessary and inevitable inclusion of the social and behavioral sciences into virtually every course.

• Developing more layperson friendly analytic tools: The rarified atmosphere of academia and research is overly conducive to "research speak" in which virtually every statement is so qualified that the end product is usable by only a few, but capable of distortion by many.
• Examining research for unintended consequences: No one can, or should, put the genie back in the bottle. Assume, for the sake of argument, though, that all of the knowledge we have is just theory based on unprovable core assumptions. If the theory is absolutely true, what implications does that have for justice policy? If the theory is untrue, but treated as if it was true, what implications does that have for justice practice?
• Explaining the limitations of social science from the very beginning when teaching: Paradigmatic analysis is not all that complex. If students were taught from the very beginning how similar all social science theory is rather than how different the disciplines are, then the study of social science--and justice, might look very different.
• Do not forget that we are all philosophers, we just have different methodologies to approach the same questions.

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1. A significant portion of what follows in the next sections has been included in several courses taught by the authors for several years. With that comment the authors apologize for condensing some important points and the reifying others.

2. The basic idea for these three models belongs to Professor Murray Blumenthal of the University of Denver College of Law. He used them as a way of explaining legal theory in his Law and Society classes in the early 1980s. He actually used the categories of "God Model" (absolute), Philosopher King (equity) and Due Process and did not discuss them in the context of paradigmatic thought.

3. The Four Corners exercise is one of the teaching techniques presented to faculty who take part in the "Ideas for Professors" teaching seminars at the University of Nevada, Reno.